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1.1 Income Inequality and Political Participation 
On a cold day in September of 2011, in response to the growing corporate 
influence in democracy and fears that government was becoming less representative, a 
group of concerned citizens gathered in New York’s Zuccotti Park to protest decades of 
rising income inequality in America. Thus was born the “Occupy Wall Street” movement, 
which spurred a global movement against rapidly increasing income inequality 
worldwide, and served as a focusing event for concerns that inequality had grown too 
large in America. In 2012, income inequality reached its highest point since 1928, right 
before the Great Depression.  
For the last forty years, the United States has experienced dramatic increases in 
income inequality, or the income difference between the haves and the have-nots. 
America’s top ten percent now average more than nine times as much income as the 
bottom ninety percent of income earners. This is up from just three times as much in the 
early 1970s. The incomes of the top one percent of income earners accounts for twenty-
four percent of all incomes earned in America, up from just nine percent forty years ago. 
The rate of income increase for the top ten percent of income earners is almost eight 
times larger than that of those earning median incomes. The nation’s lowest-wage 
workers have actually seen decreases in their real, inflated adjusted wages.  Between 
1977 and 2017, income of the top one percent of U.S. earners increased by over 265 
percent. Over the same period, the bottom ninety percent of earners have seen their 
average income increase by 21 percent. The Gini coefficient, an often-used measure of 
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income inequality, has increased from a low of .314 in 1967 to .406 in 2017, an increase 
of almost 30%. 
 Income inequality has increasingly entered the public discourse. The lasting 
effects of the Great Recession, the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the presidential 
campaign of Bernie Sanders, have all increased the salience of this issue. The majority 
of Americans see the gap between the rich and the poor increasing and want something 
to be done about it. Recent studies by McCall (2013) indicate that 66 percent of 
Americans believe that the gap between the rich and the poor is too wide, 56 percent of 
Americans believe that inequality continues to benefit the rich at the expense of the 
poor, and 52 percent of Americans believe that these differences in incomes are 
unnecessary for American prosperity. Additionally, 69 percent of Americans believe that 
the government should do something to reduce this gap, while 54 percent specifically 
favor taxing the wealthy to expand aid to the poor (Pew 2014). 
Figure 1.1. Rising Income Inquality and Media Attention1 
 
 
                                            
1 Source: New York Times (LexisNexis Archives), Inequality data from Frank (2014) 
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Media attention to the issue of income inequality has also risen in the United 
States over the last 20 years. Figure 1.1 shows the number of New York Times articles 
on the issue of income inequality for the years 1992 to 2015 as well as the 
corresponding Gini coefficient of income inequality (Frank 2014). Figure 1.1 
demonstrates two trends, which appear to be correlated; the increase, although 
unsteady, of income inequality over this period, as well as the increasing attention that 
the news media has given to this issue. Whether the news media is responding to 
actual changes in inequality or the public’s increasing concern on this issue is hard to 
determine, but they are related. The increase in media attention to income inequality 
produced by the 2012 Occupy Wall Street movement is also apparent in Figure 1.1. 
Since 1992, inequality has been increasing, and both media and public attention to this 
issue has increased.   
Figure 1.2. Monthly Media Tone on the Issue  of Income Inequality2  (New York Times 
and Washington Post) 
 
                                            
2 Source: Data collected for Eshbaugh-Soha and McGauvran (2018) 
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The media have not portrayed a positive tone towards this issue. The majority of 
news sources, including conservative sources, have portrayed this issue in a negative 
light (Eshbaugh-Soha and McGauvran 2018). Figure 1.2 is a monthly aggregation of the 
number of positive and negative sentiments about income inequality from the New York 
Times and Washington Post for years 1999-2013, with negative numbers indicating that 
a larger proportion of mentions were negative. It is apparent that the vast majority of 
coverage of income inequality is negative. In fact, for only one month over this period 
was the aggregate tone on inequality coverage positive. This month corresponds to a 
dramatic drop in inequality in 2002, which can be seen in Figure 1.1, and the coverage 
of the issue quickly returned to framing it in negative terms. These trends correspond to 
the findings of McCall (2013) and Pew Research (2014) that show that the public is 
becoming increasingly aware of inequality, and the majority of people consider this 
increase a bad thing.       
Previous economic theories indicate that as income inequality increases, a larger 
proportion of the population should desire redistributive benefits (Meltzer and Richard 
1980). Therefore, increasing income inequality should increase levels of political 
participation as people compete for the resources and particularized benefits of 
government. Political participation should become more attractive as a means to 
improve their circumstances. In response to this, and because of the expected costs of 
redistributive programs, the well-off should mobilize to counteract the increased 
participation of the poor. E.E. Schattschneider argues that minority parties are 
motivated to extend benefits to new groups of individuals to increase the size of their 
coalitions (1960). Therefore, in an attempt to increase their constituency, the minority 
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party should work to mobilize the poor, thus increasing participation. However, the 
effects of rising inequality has been the exact opposite, inequality has worked to 
diminish participation. Income inequality produces an income bias in the electorate and 
citizens in the highest income quintile are much more likely to vote (Brady 2004; Solt 
2010). 
If rising income inequality has produced a class bias in political participation (Solt 
2008) and has widened the preference gap between the rich and the poor for social 
welfare and redistributive policies (Enns and Wlezien 2011), then the idea of equal 
representation may be in danger.  One of the tenements of American democracy is “one 
person one vote” and that each citizen should be considered equally when 
representatives make policy. “A key characteristic of democracy is the continuing 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as 
political equals” (Dahl 1973, p.1). 
The threat to American democracy posed by increasing income inequality 
depends on systematic differences in participation and preferences, which lead to a 
system that is more responsive to a subset of the American electorate. If decision 
makers have become more responsive to members of certain economic classes, while 
neglecting others, it may present a real problem for American democracy. The following 
research will address the link between income inequality and political preferences and 
participation. 
 
1.2 The Importance of California for Studying Income Inequality 
Single state analysis is often met with questions regarding the external validity of 
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any findings produced. There is some evidence however, that focusing on California, a 
state with considerable diversity, may produce meaningful findings. Although California 
is not fully representative of the entire nation, the state is optimal for studying the effects 
of race and class since the differences that do exist indicate trends that are expected for 
the nation in the future (Hajnal 2007). California has a long history with direct 
democracy, and the voters in this state rely more heavily on ballot propositions to 
decide state policy than in most states (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2002). A 
heavy reliance on direct democracy means that voters in the state of California are likely 
to be better informed due to the prominence of major campaigns focusing on the 
initiative process (Gerber 1999).  
Demographically, California looks like what researchers predict the rest of the 
nation will look like in the near future (Reyes et al. 2001; Census Bureau 2001). Anglos 
have become a slight minority in the population, and the Latino population has grown 
larger than the African American population. These trends indicate that the racial 
context in California has become more diverse, which is also occurring across the 
nation. California, particularly, has transcended the simple Anglo-African American 
dichotomy, which has influenced the majority of racial and ethnic politics literature since 
V.O. Key (1966), due to its increasing Latino population. Additionally, the African 
American population in California is very similar to what is found in the rest of the nation 
in terms of age, urban residence, and family structure (Hajnal 2007). The only exception 
is that the African American middle-class is larger and more established than in other 
states (Reyes et al. 2001; Smelser et al. 2001), but this is also a trend expected 
elsewhere. Finally, California has a larger Asian population, approximately 15 percent, 
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than any other state besides Hawaii. However, Asian born immigration has recently 
exceeded that of Latin born immigration nationally (Pew 2017), making the trend seen in 
California expected elsewhere.    
Economically, California is a very diverse state. According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, California has regions that rely heavily on sectors that are prominent around 
the country, such as agriculture, extractive resources and mining, tourism, computer 
and tech industries, manufacturing, service sector jobs, and many others. From the 
mining and timber rich north to the agricultural heavy central valley, the tech heavy 
Silicon Valley, the entertainment and service industry rich south, to mining and oil 
extraction in the east, and everything in between. For these reasons, California serves 
as a good proxy for the economic makeup of many regions around the country. All of 
these characteristics make California an important test case, and though it may not be 
fully externally applicable to the rest of the nation at present, it accounts for trends that 
are expected elsewhere in the near future.    
 
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation  
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation,” From Sweaty Hands to Greased Palms: Income 
Inequality and the Distribution of Economic Policy Preferences” I analyze how differing 
levels of income inequality has effected preferences for liberal economic policies. 
Recent class and inequality research has indicated that rising inequality has increased 
the public’s negative opinions on inequality, yet has relatively unchanged their 
preferences for redistribution (McCarty et al. 2006; McCall 2013). Other researchers 
have shown that rising income inequality produces a divergence in the preferences of 
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the haves and the have-nots, especially for economic policies (Kelly and Enns 2010; 
Soroka and Wlezien 2008; Ura and Ellis 2008; Moene and Wallerstein 2001). However, 
researchers have yet to show if this finding extends beyond public opinion, or if rising 
income inequality can influence policy outcomes. Using new voting data from California, 
I show that increasing inequality can affect support for liberal economic policies, but that 
this effect is contingent on resources. Finally, I show that income inequality produces an 
economic cleavage that extends beyond public opinion to vote choice, which can 
influence policy outcomes.  
Utilizing community based voting and inequality data from 1992 to 2012, and 
spatial regression modeling to account for the spatial components of inequality and 
preference, I show that there is an interactive relationship between levels of income 
inequality, median group incomes, and support for redistributive policies. As median 
income increases, the effect that rising inequality has on support for liberal economic 
policies increases.  Additionally, I show that initial increases in the levels of income 
inequality cause preferences to become bi-modally distributed, indicating that greater 
political conflict and mobilization should occur. The results indicate that as the disparity 
between the rich and the poor increases, opposing policy preferences become more 
equitably distributed. The voting decisions of individuals are affected, and these 
changes can have meaningful impact on policy, especially where direct democracy is 
possible. 
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation,” A Competition Theory of the Effects of Income 
Inequality on Political Participation”, I analyze the effect of higher levels of inequality on 
participation rates. In this chapter, I explore three previous models of the effect that 
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increasing inequality should have on participation rates and suggest a new model that 
better explains how inequality affects participation. Previous research on the 
relationship between income inequality and political participation finds that societies with 
the greatest income equality often have the highest levels of participation, while the 
most unequal populations often have the lowest levels of participation. While these 
studies specify the relationship between inequality and participation as linear, there are 
reasons to believe that changes in inequality affect rates of political participation 
contingent on both the size of the change as well as the current levels of inequality. This 
chapter theorizes that the relationship between income inequality and participation is 
curvilinear, with increases at lower levels of inequality increasing participation and 
increases at higher levels decreasing participation.  
To test these theoretical claims I use community level voting data in California 
from 1992 to 2012 and account for the spatial components of participation and income, 
this chapter provides evidence that the effects of income inequality on participation 
depend on the current levels of, and size of change in, income inequality. This paper 
finds that increases in income inequality actually increase participation in economically 
homogeneous populations, likely due to increases in political conflict and mobilization, 
while increases in income inequality in economically heterogeneous populations 
decrease participation, because of the decreasing competitiveness and relative power 
differences inherent to highly unequal populations.  This finding suggests that previous 
research, which treats this relationship as linear, may be misinterpreting the effect of 




In Chapter 4 of this dissertation,” From the Poorhouse to the Voting Booth: The 
Effect of Income Inequality and Race or Ethnicity on Voting”, I analyze how higher levels 
of inequality affect the participation rates of different racial/ethnic groups. I draw upon 
recent research on the effects of in-group connections to show that minority groups 
respond to higher levels of inequality differently that Anglos. Recent research has 
shown that increasing income inequality in America has led to decreasing levels of 
political participation in the form of voting. Additionally, reduced levels of voting have 
occurred unevenly by class, with the largest decreases coming from the poor and 
middle class. However, these studies have treated all Americans the same while not 
accounting for the possibility of different responses to increasing income inequality from 
different racial and ethnic groups. I theorize that increasing inequality will produce a 
divergence in political preferences, producing greater conflict over the appropriate 
course of policy. When this happens, minority populations will have a greater incentive 
to work towards the betterment of the group due to their stronger in-group attachments, 
which produce higher levels of participation than Anglos. 
To test these theoretical claims I examine neighborhood voting rates and levels 
of income inequality from 1992 to 2012 and utilize spatial regression modeling. This 
paper develops a theoretical framework to show that different racial/ethnic groups 
respond to changing levels of income inequality differently. While both the Anglo poor 
and wealthy Anglo neighborhoods become increasingly disenfranchised, African 
American and Latina/o neighborhoods respond with an increase in participation. As 
inequality increases, wealthy minority neighborhoods show rates of participation well 
above that of wealthy Anglo neighborhoods. Even poor minority neighborhoods respond 
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to higher levels of income inequality with increased participation, even though they 
never reach the level of participation seen in poor Anglo neighborhoods. This finding 
emphasizes the importance of the interaction between race/ethnicity, class, and income 
inequality and suggests that the lack of social capital within the poor Anglo community is 
driving the lower levels of voter turnout identified in previous research. 
Finally, chapter 5 concludes the dissertation. In this chapter, I summarize my 
findings, discuss the scholarly and practical implications of my research, and discuss 





FROM SWEATY HANDS TO GREASED PALMS; ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC POLICY PREFERENCES 
2.1 Chapter Abstract 
Recent research on class and inequality has attempted to determine if rising 
income inequality produces a divergence in the preferences of the haves and the have-
nots, especially for economic policies. Researchers have yet to show if this finding 
extends beyond public opinion, or if rising income inequality can affect policy outcomes. 
Using new voting data from California, I show that increasing inequality produces an 
economic cleavage that extends to vote choice, which can affect policy outcomes. 
Utilizing community based voting and inequality data from 1992 to 2012, and spatial 
regression modeling to account for the spatial components of inequality and preference, 
I show that inequality affects the distribution of policy preferences on ballot initiatives 
dealing with economic policies. The results indicate that as the disparity between the 
rich and the poor increases, opposing policy preferences become more equitably 
distributed, which could lead to greater levels of policy competition. The voting decisions 
of individuals are affected, and these changes can have meaningful impact on policy, 
especially where direct democracy is possible. 
 
2.2 Introduction 
Since the early 1970s, the American economic environment has been defined by 
an almost steady increase in inequality. The American Political Science Association’s 
(APSA) taskforce on inequality and American democracy concluded that rising 
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economic inequality may be posing a severe threat to our form of representative 
democracy by affecting policy preference formation (Jacobs et al. 2004). Yet little is 
known about how the rising levels of economic inequality have affected policy 
preferences for the mass public. Researchers addressing this relationship have been 
unable to reach a consensus. Some have concluded that rising economic inequality is 
strengthening class-bias in preferences, where the rich and poor diverge in their 
preferences for social welfare policies (Edsall 1984; Gilens 2005; Avery 2015). Other 
researchers have concluded that the rich and the poor have not diverged in their policy 
preferences, where individuals at all levels of economic stratification follow a similar 
pattern in their preferences over time (Bartels 2005; Soroka and Wlezien 2008; Ura and 
Ellis 2008; Kelly and Enns 2010). However, if increasing inequality is systematically 
affecting social policy preference distributions in the American mass public, then, as the 
APSA taskforce feared, inequality could potentially threaten American democracy by 
representing the preferences of a single class.  
While previous literature has examined the effects of rising inequality on 
preferences for redistributive policies (Bartels 2008; McCall 2013), this research has 
only examined how inequality has affected level of support, ignoring the effects that 
income inequality has on the distribution of preferences within the electorate. At higher 
levels of inequality, the haves become fewer, with more individual resources, while the 
have-nots become greater, with less individual resources, and this produces an income 
bias in preferences.  This research differs slightly from previous models by focusing on 
the compositional change in individuals at different economic positions in the electorate. 
By focusing on the difference in the distribution of preferences, this research shows that 
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as populations become more economically unequal, the distribution of preferences 
become less heavily skewed towards either support or opposition, becoming more 
bimodally distributed, potentially leading to higher levels of political competition.  
In section three, this paper addresses the influence that income inequality has 
had on economic policy preferences and discusses two theoretical models that attempt 
to explain the relationship between inequality and support for redistribution. Section four 
develops a theory for how income inequality will affect the distribution of preferences 
within an electorate. Section five develops a modeling structure to test the theory and 
explains the data used. Section six presents the results and interpretation. Section 
seven offers concluding remarks and insights. 
 
2.3 Income Inequality and Preference  
It is important to address the relationship between increasing economic inequality 
and mass policy preferences, as the existence of a systematic relationship may lead 
America towards unequal democracy (Bartels 2008). If class-bias in preferences is 
increasing, and the government becomes more responsive to the preferences of a 
single segment of the population, then the government has become less representative 
of the whole population. If government institutions become more representative of the 
preferences of specific economic groups, then the voices of certain citizens are being 
heard unequally (Gilens 2005, 2009). While this assumes that rising inequality affects 
the distribution of preferences, which is the focus of this paper, it also assumes that it 
could lead to greater levels of political competition, which could ameliorate the class-
bias in participation (Bartels 2008; Solt 2010; Leighley and Nagler 2013).  
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Researchers have identified two competing models to explain how increasing 
inequality affects policy preferences. The first model asserts that when inequality rises, 
the mass public responds by wanting greater levels of redistribution, such as social 
welfare or tax and transfer policies that redistribute resources from the wealthy to the 
poor (Meltzer and Richards 1981).  The second model contends the converse, that 
when inequality rises, the mass public responds with less support for redistributive 
policies (Bénabou 2000). This section will provide an overview of these competing 
models, and the next section will provide empirical evidence from recent scholarship.   
 
2.3.1 Inequality Generates Redistribution 
Increasing economic inequality affects political preferences by pushing support 
for redistribution higher (Meltzer and Richards 1981). This theory is predicated on two 
hypothetical log-normal distributions with the same mean income, but with different 
median incomes and variances. When the distribution of incomes becomes more 
unequal, or the variance in incomes increases, support for policies that will move the 
median income towards the mean income will become more favorable to the mass 
public. In short, when inequality rises, the mass public responds by requesting more 
government activity in the form of redistribution. One of the theoretical implications of 
this model is that it produces a cross-cutting effect on preference formation as a result 
of increasing inequality. 
An individual’s preference for more governmental redistribution is conditioned on 
their placement in the income distribution. Individuals with incomes below the median 
will favor some sort of redistribution, to produce lower levels of economic inequality, 
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while those with incomes above the median do not. Thus, increasing income inequality 
produces a cross-cutting effect on support for redistribution (Page and Jacobs 2009). 
When the expected costs of redistributive programs increase, as a result of increased 
inequality, both the nature and type of benefits desired by the different classes becomes 
more opposed, with the poor showing greater desire for increased redistribution. The 
well-off will have stronger preferences for less redistribution, since the increased 
disparity between the poor and the well-off will increase the expected costs of 
redistribution. The poor will have greater preferences for redistribution since the 
expected benefits of redistribution will increase with economic inequality, as the relative 
disparity of their position becomes greater (Fong 2001)3. As inequality increases, and 
the median income moves farther below the mean income, a greater majority of 
individuals will be below the average income, and the overall effect will be a greater 
preference for redistribution, since it will benefit a greater segment of the population. 
Some empirical analysis has provided support for the Meltzer and Richards model 
(Brady 2004; Edsall 1984; McCartney et al. 2006; Enns and Wlezien 2011; Avery 2015; 
Gilens 2009).   
 
2.3.2 Inequality Suppresses Redistribution Model 
This theory proposes that rising levels of economic inequality will be met with 
lower levels of support for redistributive policies (Bénabou 2000). While some 
                                            
3 Individual preferences for the levels of redistribution, based on self-interest and egalitarian beliefs, are a 
function of an individual’s relative disparity (Major 1994; Fong 2001). As income inequality increases, the 
relative disparity between the incomes of the poor and mean incomes increase, and the poor often seek 
both higher levels of redistribution based on self-interest, as well as a larger proportion of the poor reject 
the notions of equality-of-opportunity and become more supportive of redistribution (Newman et al. 2015).   
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researchers have asserted that this may seem counterintuitive (Kelly and Enns 2010), 
they conclude that rising inequality can actually drive support for redistribution lower. 
The causal logic inherent to Bénabou’s theory is based on the assertion that 
redistribution can enhance aggregate welfare. This is a phenomenon not accounted for 
in the previous model. If one starts with the assumption that some redistributive policies 
can improve ex ante welfare, then the implication is that their political support tends to 
decrease with an increase to economic inequality. 
Redistribution can lead to aggregate welfare improvements (Bakija 2014), so 
support for redistribution should be almost unanimous. However, when inequality rises, 
the aggregated benefits of redistribution decrease proportional to an increase in 
inequality. Therefore, when the aggregated benefits from redistribution are large relative 
to the levels of income inequality, this model predicts overwhelming support for 
redistribution. But when inequality rises, the proportion of the population that stand to 
lose from greater levels of redistribution increases. As long as the aggregated welfare 
benefit from redistribution is large enough relative to the levels of economic inequality, 
increases in inequality will produce lower levels of support for redistribution. One of the 
implications of this model is that support for redistributive policies will not differ by 
economic strata; that the majority of the population should have similar preferences for 
redistribution. There has been some empirical support for this theorized relationship 
between rising economic inequality and preference formation for social welfare policies 
(Kelly and Enns 2010; Soroka and Wlezien 2008; Ura and Ellis 2008; Moene and 
Wallerstein 2001).   
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2.3.3 Preference Stability 
There are multiple reasons to believe that rising inequality should increase 
support for redistributive policies. Rational choice (see Lau 2003) and economic self-
interest (Downs 1957, Sears et al. 1980) would indicate that as income inequality 
increased, members of poorer classes should show higher levels of support for 
redistribution, while members of higher economic classes should show lower levels. 
Increased income inequality can also affect the formation of political values such as 
egalitarianism (Brown 1988) and support for meritocracy (Newman et al. 2015), which 
can have differing effects on preferences for redistribution. Egalitarian values may be 
activated when inequality increases, leading to increased support for redistribution, but 
the activation of egalitarian sentiments is mitigated by socioeconomic status (Chatard 
and Selimbegovic 2007). Increasing income inequality also affects sentiments 
concerning meritocracy, or the idea that people who work hard should be able to get 
ahead, causing lower economic individuals to reject meritocracy and high-income 
individuals to become more supportive (Newman et al. 2015).  While these factors 
would indicate that increasing income inequality should increase support for 
redistribution, empirical evidence of this phenomenon has been less forthcoming.  
Researchers examining the effects of income inequality on policy preferences 
have concluded that, for the most part, preferences are stable within economic class. 
The rich and the poor have been found to respond to changes in the economic 
environment in consistently similar ways (Kelly and Enns 2010), as economic self-
interest often plays only a minor role in shaping an individual’s political behavior or 
policy preferences (Citrin and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1991; Jaeger 2006; Margalit 
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2013). Additional researchers have found little evidence to show that rising inequality 
will produce a change in redistributive policy preferences as the opinions of the mass 
public follow a similar pattern over time, thus there is no great divergence between the 
rich and the poor (Soroka and Wlezien 2008; Ura and Ellis 2008). Thus, the preferences 
of those at the top and at the bottom move together, indicating that the difference in 
preferences between the rich and the poor should also remain stable (Ura and Ellis 
2008), and inequality should not create an income-bias in the distribution of preferences 
in the population. As inequality changes, the rich will increase/decrease their support for 
redistribution in similar proportions to the poor.  
These findings are explained, as Bartels (2005) indicates, by a permissive 
ambivalence in the American electorate on issues of income inequality. For the 
American people, there is a big gap between seeing growing inequality as a bad thing 
and wanting to do something about it. Page and Jacobs (2009) contend that the vast 
majority of Americans are ideologically liberal, but functionally conservative. Research 
has thus indicated that American people acknowledge that increasing economic 
inequality is problematic, but do not respond to this by desiring the government to act, 
or that it is the governments’ responsibility to do anything about it. Justification for these 
findings have primarily come in two forms. The first concludes that the majority of 
individuals do not have enough information or interest to be able to connect their 
economic wellbeing to their policy preferences (Bartels 2005, 2008; McCall and 
Kenworthy 2009). The second concludes that inequality is not a large enough concern 
to change values, like individualism, that underlie individuals’ preferences for 
redistribution (Bobo 1991; Feldman 1999; Page and Jacobs 2009). While preference for 
20 
 
inequality may be stable, inequality can influence the distribution of policy preferences 
by affecting the distribution of individuals within the economic spectrum. 
There is some evidence indicating that increases in income inequality have 
affected preferences. In one of the few works that employs sub-state analysis, Newman 
et al. (2015) indicate that rising income inequality has changed individual preferences at 
the community level, through changing value structures. Gilens (2009) finds that rising 
income inequality can shift preferences on redistribution, but only marginally for people 
at the very top or boom of the income spectrum. Additionally, Flavin (2012) indicates 
that income inequality has increased, so has the general liberalism of the poor, 
suggesting that a larger proportion should be supportive of redistribution.  
Whether or not changes in income inequality are able to change preferences in a 
systematic way between income groups, with the poor becoming increasingly 
supportive of redistribution and the wealthy being much less supportive, does not ipso 
facto indicate that it cannot change public preferences. In fact, the lack of a systematic 
change within, or between, income groups is not necessarily an indication that the 
distribution of preferences remains stable. Rising income inequality can change 
aggregate preferences by affecting the distribution of individuals, with preferences in-
line with their economic positions, within an electorate. This is exactly how increasing 
inequality can change the distribution of preferences without changing individual group 
preferences. The next section develops a theory to show how income inequality will 
affect the distribution of preferences within an electorate  
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2.4 Income Inequality and the Distribution of Preferences 
Although much of the previous research has failed to show that changing 
inequality can affect the preferences of individuals (Bartels 2005; McCall 2013), 
inequality researchers have mostly overlooked the effect of inequality in changing the 
distribution of individuals whose preferences are in-line with their economic position. 
The preferences of individuals at different places on the economic spectrum differ, often 
in-line with their economic positions. The preferences of the rich and poor often differ, 
with the poor wanting greater levels of redistribution (Gilens 2005; Gilens 2009; Avery 
2015), and the well-off being less supportive of policies that ameliorate inequality. 
Researchers looking at support for greater redistributive policies have found that 
although the preferences of high and middle-class Americans do not differ substantially, 
the preferences of members of lower economic classes differ significantly from those of 
high and middle-class Americans (Enns and Wlezien 2011; Avery 2015). People at the 
top of the income spectrum have drastically different opinions regarding state 
intervention to redistribute incomes than people at the bottom of the income spectrum 
(Gilens 2009). Additionally, wealthier Americans show substantially lower levels of 
support for policies designed to reduce economic inequality, or its substantial effects 
(Kelly and Witko 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2010). This effect extends beyond 
preferences for redistribution to larger economic policy and ideological polarization. 
 
2.4.1 Distributional Change 
Higher income Americans disproportionately support conservative economic 
policies (Brady 2004), the Republican Party (Edsall 1984; McCartney et al. 2006), and 
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are more consistent in their partisan attachments (Garand 2010; Bhatti and Erickson 
2011). In recent years, demographic shifts, increased partisan sorting along class lines, 
and blacks and women being disproportionately at the bottom end of the economic 
stratum, has led to partisanship becoming more stratified by income (McCartney et al. 
2003). As a result, political parties, both in the electorate and in government, become 
more ideologically polarized during periods of high income inequality, leading to an 
increase in polarization in the mass public (Garand 2010). Democratic and Republican 
identifiers stake out divergent ideological positions as a function of income inequality, 
which in turn affects the polarization of representatives.  
These findings indicate that increasing income inequality will increase partisan 
polarization; resulting from shifts in the demographic composition of the electorate, not a 
change in preexisting preferences. As there are existing differences in preferences for 
economic policies among class lines, inequality may be affecting preferences by 
changing the distribution of haves and have-nots within a population. As an example, in 
populations with near equality of incomes, most if not all of the individuals should hold 
similar self-interest based preferences on economic issues, and the group with that 
preference would be the majority. As income inequality increases, preferences will start 
to diverge, as some individuals move from the majority to the minority opinion. Where 
populations are economically homogeneous, there should be very little preference 
differences, as the benefit for any particular policy should be equivalent among the 
population. This is true for both poor and wealthy communities. An increase in 
redistribution would benefit the vast majority of an economically homogeneous poor 
community while it would carry a cost to the majority of an economically homogeneous 
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wealthy community. However, Figure 2.14 shows an interesting trend in the relationship 
between community inequality and median income. In communities in the bottom 
quintile of inequality (low inequality), the distribution of median incomes is more diffuse 
and includes more communities above the community median for the entire population. 
In communities in the top quintile of inequality (high inequality), the distribution of 
median incomes is less diffuse and disproportionately below the community median for 
the entire population. As inequality increases in a community, the likelihood that that 
communities’ median income is going to be below the population median increases.  
Figure 2.1. Distribution of Median Incomes at different levels of Income Inequality 
 
As a recent example, California’s Proposition 38 (2012) was a proposed increase 
to the state income tax rates that would have affected mostly wealthy Californians, and 
was expected to increase revenues to the state of about $10 billion a year, most of 
                                            
4 Figure 2.1 is the proportion of neighborhood median incomes in California between 1992 and 2012, 
separated by levels of inequality. High and low inequality corresponds to neighborhoods in the bottom 
and top quintile of inequality.    
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which would go to benefit poorer Californians. Verdugo City, a neighborhood of 
Glendale California, which is a northern suburb of Los Angeles, and Mount Laguna, a 
small city just south in San Diego County, are among the most economically equal 
populations in southern California. However, while Mount Laguna has a median income 
well above $100,000 a year, the median income of Verdugo City is less than $15,000 a 
year. In the 2012 election 85% of voters in Mount Laguna voted in opposition of the 
ballot proposition, while 82% of voters in Verdugo City voted to support it. This 
illustrates the relationship between economic homogeneity and preference 
homogeneity, when a population has low income inequality, the preferences of that 
population are founded on the relative economic position of that population. Yet this 
example just illustrates the effect at the ends of the economic stratum, extremely poor 
and extremely wealthy communities, and explains nothing about communities that have 
median incomes. However, even in cities with median incomes the trend appears to be 
consistent with their economic preferences, even cities whose median incomes are in-
line with California as a whole show similar effects. Edison California, a suburb of 
Bakersfield, is also one of the most economically equal populations in California and 
has a median income similar to that of California as a whole. Voters in Edison opposed 
Proposition 38 by a margin of 67% to 32% support. In fact, for all cities in California in 
the bottom quintile of income inequality, the average absolute difference between 
support and opposition of ballot Proposition 38 was 31%. 
At higher levels of income inequality, political preferences start to diverge, as the 
proportions of the population at either side of the economic spectrum changes. Initially, 
as the level of income inequality increases, the proportion of individuals on the other 
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side of median income increases and the distribution of preferences will become more 
equal. As an example, if income inequality increased in Mount Laguna, the proportion of 
the population at lower levels of income would increase, shifting the median income 
down. This would likely increase the proportion of the population who support 
Proposition 38. Likewise, if income inequality increased in Verdugo City, the proportion 
of the population at higher levels of income would increase, shifting the median income 
up, likely leading to an increase in the proportion of the population who oppose 
Proposition 38. Each of these changes would cause the proportion of the population 
whose preference differs to become more equal. However, this equalizing effect should 
not continue once the population reached the highest possible economic parity, as there 
should be a point in which further increasing inequality should increase the proportion of 
the population at lower levels on the income spectrum.  
At middling levels of inequality, there will be greater differences in political 
preferences as their will be a smaller difference in the proportion of the population that 
hold differing preferences. However, in populations with the highest levels of income 
inequality, preferences will be more polarized. At high level of income inequality, defined 
by a few individuals with relatively high incomes and many individuals with relatively low 
incomes, distributional inequality creates a situation in which preferences should be 
unequal, as the majority of the population should support economic policies that benefit 
the poor. Therefore, the distribution of preferences, as an effect of income inequality 
can be defined. At very low levels of income inequality, the distribution of preferences 
should be modally distributed, predicated on the median income of the population. As 
income inequality increases, the distribution of preferences should become more 
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normally distributed around median preferences. At parity, the distribution of 
preferences will be normally distributed, with equal proportion of individuals supporting 
and opposing economic policies aimed at stemming inequality. Once parity is reached, 
higher levels of inequality will cause the distribution of preferences to start to skew 
towards the preference of individuals with lower incomes, and the distribution of 
preferences will again become unequal. Looking at Proposition 38 once more, the 
average absolute difference between support and opposition for cities in the middle-
income inequality quintile was 9% and 21% for the highest quintile.5 This curvilinear 
relationship serves as an explanation why previous literature has been unable to 
determine how income inequality affects preferences, especially for economic policies.   




                                            
5  The average absolute difference in support and opposition for prop 38 in 2012, for all cities in California 
was 30.886% for the lowest income inequality quintile, 19.511% for the second quintile, 9.244% for the 
third quintile, 12.398%  for the fourth quintile, and 20.536%  for the highest quintile.  
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2.4.2 Hypotheses  
Given the effect that inequality should have on the distribution of preferences 
towards economic policies, the difference between the proportion of the population that 
either support or oppose economic policies should become more evenly distributed as 
inequality increases. Preferences should continue to become more equally distributed 
as inequality increases, as the distribution of haves and have-nots in the population also 
become more equally distributed. Once a critical middle value is reached, and additional 
increases in inequality starts to increase the proportion of have-nots in relation to the 
proportion of haves, the proportion of the population below the population median 
income will increase, and preferences will start to become less equally distributed. As 
inequality reaches its highest levels, the distribution of preferences should again 
become unequal, as the proportion of the population at the bottom of the income 
distribution increases. This theory is presented graphically in Figure 2.2. 
This theory produces four testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Communities with low median incomes will have higher support for 
economic policies than communities with a high median income  
Hypothesis 2.2: When inequality is low, the distribution of preferences will be skewed 
towards the median income of the community.  
Hypothesis 2.3: As income inequality increases from its lowest levels, the distribution of 
different preferences will move toward parity. 
Hypothesis 2.4: Once income inequality reaches a critical level, increases in inequality 
will produce deviations in the distribution of preferences.  
 
2.5 Data and Methods 
To test these hypotheses, I employ election and demographic data at the census 
block-group level in the state of California from 1992-2012. This analysis will take 
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advantage of two unique factors. First is the state of California’s publically available 
voter information at the census block and tract level. Second is California’s systematic 
reliance on direct democracy in the form of ballot initiatives. Examining ballot initiatives 
allows this research to determine preferences from voting data, which covers a larger 
proportion of California than any currently available public opinion polling data. From 
1910 through 2012, 1,216 statewide ballot propositions were on the California ballot. 
However, this analysis is bounded between 1992 and 2012, which includes 285 ballot 
propositions, 206 of which specifically relate to issues of economic inequality, seen in 
Figure 2.3. This method produces between 21,000 and 22,000 observations per year, 
which is much larger than previous studies. Research at the census tract level will allow 
for a greater variation of political and socioeconomic contexts, and allow this research to 
control for the spatial components of inequality and preference formation as previous 
studies have found high levels of global and local spatial autocorrelation in regional 
income dispersions (Rey and Montouri 1999). The information on economic makeup at 
the census block level is available through the California Secretary of State’s office in 
concert with the U.S. Census Bureau and California Department of State.  
 
2.5.1 Data  
The primary dependent variable for preferences is the absolute difference 
between support and opposition for ballot initiatives with an explicitly economic frame. 
The selection of the subset of ballot initiatives was based on media framing these 
                                            
6 The analysis is limited to propositions which appear on the general election ballots to avoid the potential 
issues of bias inherent to midterm or special elections.   
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initiatives as economic policies directed at improving inequality7. For each of the 
propositions, a census block-group measure of preference distribution was calculated 
from the California Statewide Database. This measure is equal to the absolute 
difference in the proportion of the population that supported and opposed each 
proposition. This measure indicates how equal the distribution of preferences is within a 
population. The value ranges between a low of zero, indicating that an equal proportion 
of the population supported and opposed the proposition, and a value of one, indicating 
that the entire population voted either to support or oppose. The mean value for this 
variable is .202 with a standard deviation of .139. 
Figure 2.3. California Ballot Initiatives with Inequality Frame (1992-2012) 
Election Name Description Outcome 
November 1992 Proposition 167 Increase a variety of taxes Defeated 
November 1993 Proposition 172 Add a 1/2% state sales tax targeted for local public safety Approved 
 Proposition 173 $185 million in bonds for first-time homebuyers Defeated 
November 1994 Proposition 185 4% tax on retail sales of gasoline Defeated 
November 1996 Proposition 210 Minimum wage increase to $5.00 (1997), and $5.75 (1998) Approved 
 Proposition 217 Reinstate 10% (over $115,00) and 11% (over $230,000) tax rates Defeated 
November 1998 Proposition 10 New tax on cigarettes to pay for childhood programs Approved 
 Proposition 11 Local governments tax revenue sharing agreements Approved 
November 2000 Proposition 37 Redefines some fees as taxes Defeated 
November 2002 Proposition 47 $13.05 billion in bonds for kindergarten-university facilities Approved 
November 2004 Proposition 67 Fund emergency medical services with tax increase Defeated 
November 2005 Proposition 76 Lid on school funding Defeated 
November 2006 Proposition 87 New tax on gas, oil Defeated 
November 2008 Proposition 3 $980 million in bonds for children’s hospitals. Approved 
 Proposition 10 $5 billion in bonds for alternative fuels Defeated 
 Proposition 12 $900 million in bonds for home, farm purchasing assistance for vets Approved 
November 2010 Proposition 24 Eliminates three business tax breaks Defeated 
November 2012 Proposition 30 Jerry Brown's Tax Increase (revenues for general fund and education) Approved 
November 2012 Proposition 38 Molly Munger's State Income Tax Increase for Education Defeated 
November 2012 Proposition 39 Income Tax Increase for Multistate Businesses Approved 
    
                                            
7 Keyword searches of news articles from the Los Angeles Times for all ballot propositions between 1990 
and 2012 were perfumed using Lexicoder. The searches included the following key words: Income 
inequality, Income distribution, Low income, Minimum wage, Rich and Poor, unemployment, or Income 
class. This set of key words has been used previously in research on media attention to income inequality 
(Eshbaugh-Soha and McGauvran 2018). Keywords searches identified 20 ballot propositions that were 
framed as issues dealing with inequality. 
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The primary independent variable is a measure of income inequality at the 
community level. There are some reasons to believe that measuring inequality at the 
community level is the most appropriate measure of inequality as it most closely mirrors 
the levels of inequality actually experienced by individuals8. A Gini coefficient for income 
inequality is generated from income responses to the American community, aggregated 
to the census-block level, for the respective years, producing a Gini coefficient for each 
block-group-year. Over the sample, the Gini coefficient ranges from .204 to .670 with a 
mean of .362 and a standard deviation of .069. The size of the population for the block-
groups ranges from 4 to 39,248 with a mean of 1550 and a standard deviation of 930. A 
squared term for income inequality is also included to account for the curvilinear 
relationship between inequality and the distribution of preferences.  
The model includes a number of control variables measured at the block-group 
level. These controls include median family income, college graduation rates, gender 
composition, ethnic composition, difference in the two-party vote share, and ethnic 
                                            
8 Although political science researchers have yet to tackle the problem of determining the appropriate 
contextual level at which to measure inequality, the field of medicine can potentially provide some 
insights, as it has a long history of inequality research. Examining the effects of income inequality on 
morbidity, Soobader and LeClere (1999) and Krieger et al. (2002) indicate that block group and tract 
socioeconomic measures performed best. Since these studies, the levels of aggregation have become 
commonly accepted contextual levels in the fields of public health and epidemiology. While morbidity and 
the distribution of political preferences may be disparate phenomena, there are some reasons to believe 
that they have similar response mechanisms as many socioeconomic factors, such as education or 
income, affect preferences and health in much the same ways. The lower level of analysis has the 
additional benefit for the study of voter preferences by examining the economic and political context that 
people actually live in. Levels of economic inequality are the most vivid within one’s community, as most 
individuals spend very little time far from home. Examining income inequality at the state or national level 
only serves as an average level of inequality that all individuals within a population should experience and 
thus overlooks important intra-state variation in inequality. Additionally, looking at the community level 
allows this research to account for the effects of specific micro-targeting that political campaigns do at the 
sub-state level. Micro targeting is the targeting of specific groups for campaign ads and information, and 
these groups are target based on demographic data that should make them susceptible to preference 
adherence or change (Korolova 2010). Modern micro-targeting has its origins in the early 1990s as 
modern computing technology made it simpler and faster (Sosnik et al. 2006), thus should exert some 
effect at the community level during the research timeframe.   
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fractionalization. Socioeconomic status (SES) is a known determinant of economic 
policy preferences (Alesina and Giuliano 2009), as individuals at different points on the 
income spectrum often want different things. Previous studies have used income and 
education as a proxy for socioeconomic status. This study follows previous research 
and employs both median family income and the percentage of residents 25 or older 
who are college graduates as a proxy for SES.  Both of these measures come from the 
US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. To control for demographic 
features, the analysis controls for the percentage of the population that are female and 
the percentage of the population which identify as Anglo, African-American, Latino/a, 
and other (US Census Bureau), with percentage white being the omitted category.  
Intergroup conflict, rather than economic group conflict, can affect preferences 
for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano 2009), especially for members of minority 
populations, so this study employs a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of racial 
concentration for each block-group. The HHI is a sum of the squared percentage of 
each racial group that makes up the population total, producing a 0-1 index of the 





where pi is the fractional share of racial/ethic group i and n is the total number of 
racial/ethnic groups within the population. The HHI is a 0-1 index indicating the 
concentration of a population on a single firm, in this case a political party. A value of 
one indicates that all residents identify as the same racial/ethnic group, and as the value 
decreases to zero, the degree of racial/ethnic dispersion increases. This is a common 
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metric used to measure the degree of ethnic homogeneity/ heterogeneity at the nation 
state level (see Anderson and Paskeviciute 1997).    
 
2.5.2 Spatial Regression 
Research on the determinants of political preferences has indicated that 
socioeconomic status, race, and proximity to others who are politically engaged (Verba, 
Brady, and Schlozman 1995), can all influence support for economic policies. All of 
these characteristics have a spatial component, and so there is some reason to expect 
spatial dependence. The spatial dependence of individual proximity becomes an 
important function of preference decisions because people live in close proximity to 
individuals of similar racial/ethnic and economic status. Research on US metropolitan 
areas have concluded that most individuals live in highly racial/ethnic and economically 
segregated areas (Kain 2003).  Though previous research has indicated the need to 
account for proximity to others who vote (such as Merill and Groffman 1999), in terms of 
real distance, research has yet to account for spatial dependence in their models, and 
thus leaves it in the error term. By employing spatial regression analysis, this study will 
account for issues of spatial proximity when addressing the effect of increasing income 
inequality on political preferences. I test for spatial autoregression using Morans-i test.9 
                                            
9 Moran’s i-test of spatial autoregression is employed to determine if spatial dependence must be 
accounted for when modeling voting data. Moran’s i tests observation locations and values 
simultaneously for correlation with other nearby observations in a spatial dimension. Using a set of 
observations and associated variables, this test evaluates whether the pattern is clustered, dispersed or 
random. The Moran’s i-test for spatial autoregression was significant for all years (p>.05) showing a 
significant spatial autocorrelation. In this case a spatial autoregressive model must be employed. 
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There are two distinct forms of spatial autoregressive models, error dependence 
and lag dependence, and the specific model used depends on the nature of the spatial 
dependence. Starting with the OLS model: 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀 
where y is a N × 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, X is a N × K matrix 
of observations on K independent variables, β is a K × 1 vector of regression 
coefficients, and ɛ is a N × 1 vector of errors assumed to be normally and independently 
distributed (Anselin and Rey 1991). In the spatial error model the errors can no longer 
be assumed independent and identically distributed and the regression model takes the 
following form 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + λWε + τ 
where λ is the spatial autoregression coefficient, W is a N × N matrix of spatial weights 
representing the geography of the observational units, and τ is a N × 1 vector of errors 
assumed to possess the usual properties. In this form, spatial dependence influences 
the error term only and it has been shown to influence the power of tests for 
heteroscedasticity and the structural stability of regression coefficients (Anselin and Rey 
1991). 
In the spatial lag model, the standard regression equation may be rewritten as 
𝑦𝑦 = γWy + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + τ 
where γ is the spatial autoregression coefficient. In this form, the value of the dependent 
variable at a particular location is jointly determined by its values at other locations and 
OLS estimation is no longer consistent (Anselin and Rey 1991). For both the lag and 
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error models, the regression equation is solved using maximum likelihood estimation 
(Anselin and Getis 1992). 
 
2.5.3 Single State Analysis 
Single state analysis is often met with questions regarding the external validity of 
any findings produced. Though there is some evidence that focusing on California, a 
state with considerable diversity, may produce meaningful findings (Hajnal 2007). 
Hajnal indicates that though California is obviously not fully representative of the entire 
nation, the state is optimal for studying the effects of race and class since the 
differences that do exist indicate trends that should be expected for the nation in the 
future. California has a long history with direct democracy, and the voters in this state 
rely more heavily on ballot propositions to decide state policy more than most states 
(Waters 2003). A heavy reliance on direct democracy means that voters in the state of 
California are likely to be better informed (Gerber 1999) due to the prominence of major 
campaigns focusing on most initiatives. Demographically, California looks like what 
researchers predict the rest of the nation will look like in the near future (Reyes et al. 
2001; Census Bureau 2001). Economically, California is a very diverse state. According 
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, California has regions that rely heavily on a diverse 
set of sectors that are prominent around the country. As such, California serves as a 
good proxy for the economic makeup of many regions around the country. All of these 
characteristics make California an important test case, and though it may not be fully 
externally applicable to the rest of the nation at present, it accounts for trends that are 
expected elsewhere in the near future.    
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2.6 Results and Interpretation 
2.6.1 Median Income and Support for Liberal Economic Policies  
This analysis starts by examining whether communities with higher median 
incomes will have lower support for economic policies aimed at economic inequality. 
The relationship between median income and support for economic policies is 
presented in Table 2.1. The first column in Table 2.1 indicates the expected effect of 
income of support for redistributive policies when inequality is unaccounted for. Model 2 
accounts for income inequality; while Model 3 examines a potential interactive effect 
between median income and inequality and support for redistributive policies10. When all 
of the propositions are examined together,11 the findings indicate that communities with 
lower median incomes are expected to have greater levels of support for liberal 
economic policies, and communities with higher median incomes will be less so. This 
finding is consistent across all three model specifications. When the median household 
income of a community increases by $10,000, there is an expected decrease in support 
for redistributive economic policies of about 1.5%, holding all other variables constant. A 
standard deviation increase in median family incomes for a community is expected to 
decrease support for liberal economic policies by about 2.5%. At the 20th percentile of 
community incomes, expected support for liberal economic policies is about 58%, while 
at the 80th percentile, expected support for these policies is about 42%. This provides 
evidence for the first hypotheses, that the majority of preferences will be contingent on 
the median income with communities with low median incomes showing low support for 
                                            
10 The Akaike information criterion (AIC) indicates that Model 3 best fits the data. All further interpretation 
will use Model 3.  
11 Results for each specific proposition are available in Appendices A and B. 
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liberal economic policies, while communities with high median incomes show lower 
support for these policies 
Table 2.1. The Effects of Median Income and Income Inequality on Support for Liberal 
Economic Policy (All Propositions) 
 All Propositions (1992-2012) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Median family Income  -.010*** -.009*** -.015*** 
        (in $10,000) (.001) (.001) (.002) 
Income Inequality  .032 -.066** 
  (.031) (.028) 
Median Family Income*   .020*** 
        Income Inequality   (.005) 
% College graduates .002*** .002*** .002*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) 
% Female -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) 
% African American .001 .001 .001 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) 
% Latino\a .001*** .001*** .001*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) 
% Other .007*** .007*** .007*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) 
% Democratic Vote 
Share 
0.174*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 
 (.036) (.036) (.035) 
Ethnic Fractionalization .002 .001 .000 
 (.022) (.022) (.022) 
Constant 0.429*** 0.415*** 0.445*** 
 (.027) (.033) (.031) 
    
Observations 430,526 430,526 430,526 
R-squared .156 .156 .157 
AIC -199961.2 -199952.1 -200181 





The first panel of Figure 2.4 graphically illustrates the relationship between 
median household incomes and support for liberal economic policies. Consistent with 
the theory, support for economic policies is based upon the relationship between the 
median income of the population being examined and that of the state as a whole. The 
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average median income in California for the period being examined was $47,242, which 
aligns with the point where expected support for these policies drops below 50%. This 
provides further support for Hypothesis 1; communities where the median income is 
below that of the state median are expected to support economic policies aimed at 
inequality, while communities with a median income above that of the state are 
expected to oppose such policies.  
Figure 2.4. Expected Effects of Income Inequality on Support for Economic Policy: 
Support for All Liberal Economic Positions (1992-2012) 
 
 
The results indicate that inequality is conditioning the effect that income has on 
support for redistribution. This conditional relationship is evidence for the idea that 
inequality is affecting preferences for redistribution independent of its effects on the 
income distribution. The marginal effects of the interaction from Model 3 or Table 2.1 
are presented graphically, for ease of interpretation, in the second and third panels of 
Figure 2.4. The second panel in Figure 2.4 indicates that the effect of inequality 
increases as median family income increases. In short, communities with higher median 
incomes will have a greater expected increase in support for redistribution when 
inequality increases from its lowest to highest levels. This is consistent with 
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expectations concerning the distribution of preferences. In low median income 
populations, the majority of residents should already support redistribution, so a change 
in inequality should not greatly affect levels of support. In high median income 
communities with low inequality, the majority of residents should oppose redistribution. 
However, as inequality increases in high median income populations, the proportion of 
individuals below the state median should increase, increasing support for liberal 
economic policies. This is likewise true for low-income populations. In the lowest income 
populations, increases in income inequality are produced when some individuals’ 
incomes increase above the median, which actually produces small expected 
decreases to support for liberal economic policies. Therefore, the marginal effect of 
income inequality should start negative and quickly increase to positive as median 
family income increases, Model 3 in Table 2.1 provides evidence for this relationship. 
The third panel of Figure 2.4 graphically represents the marginal effect of median 
income across different levels of inequality. The model again provides evidence that is 
consistent with the expected effects. At low levels of inequality, the majority of the 
population should hold similar preferences and those preferences are predicated on 
economic position. Therefore, increases in median income at the lowest levels of 
inequality should increase opposition to liberal economic policies. Furthermore, the 
distribution of preferences at the highest levels of inequality is already well defined, 
making the effect of increasing the median income relatively week. Panel 3 of Figure 2.4 
provides evidence in support of these trends.  
Turning to the contextual control variables, the results reveals a number of 
interesting, and expected, relationship with support for liberal economic policies. First, 
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there is a strong and significant positive relationship between the proportion of the 
population with a college degree and support for redistribution. This finding provides 
support to the notion that income and inequality may be activating egalitarian values, 
which is increasing support for these policies. Higher education increases egalitarian 
attitudes (Chatard and Selimbegovic 2007), and the activation of these attitudes may be 
driving up support. Although this research falls short of testing this interactive 
relationship, it does indicate the possibility of its existence. Furthermore, the percent of 
the population that voted Democratic can also serve as a weak proxy for egalitarian 
values (Brown 1988). Taken together, there is some evidence that inequality is affecting 
support for redistribution by activating inherent societal values. Finally, communities 
with higher percentages of the population that are Latino or other race/ethnicities are 
more supportive of redistribution, while populations with higher percentages of females 
are less so. Although these findings provide some insight into the relationship between 
income inequality and preferences for liberal economic policies, these results only 
provide a part of the relationship.   
 
2.6.2 Distribution of Preferences (Liberal Economic Policies) 
This research now turns to examining the relationship between income inequality 
and the distribution of preferences. The results in Table 2.3 indicate that preferences 
are responding to differing levels of inequality in much the same was as theorized. 
Table 2.2 presents four different model specifications. Models 1 and 2 of Table 2.2 
represent the naïve and fully specified baseline models, while Models 3 and 4 represent 
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the naïve and fully specified interactive models1213. The findings from the interactive 
model are consistent with Hypothesis 2, when inequality is low, the expected difference 
in preferences is large. 
Table 2.2. The Effects of Income Inequality on Preference Distributions (All Props.)   
 All Liberal economic Propositions (1992-2012) 
 1 2 3 4 
     
Income Inequality -.014 .028 -0.718*** -0.488*** 
 (.053) (.022) (0.102) (.053) 
Income Inequality2   0.980*** 0.686*** 
   (0.138) (.085) 
Median family Income   .003***  .002*** 
        (in $10,000)  (.001)  (.001) 
% College graduates  -.000  -.000 
  (.000)  (.000) 
% Female  -.000***  -.000*** 
  (.000)  (.000) 
% African American  -.001*  -.001* 
  (.000)  (.000) 
% Latino\a  -.001***  -.001*** 
  (.000)  (.000) 
% Other  -.001***  -.001*** 
  (.000)  (.000) 




% Democratic2  .339***  .336*** 







Constant 0.207*** 0.209*** 0.329*** 0.297*** 
 (.019) (.025) (.024) (.022) 
     
Observations 430,526 430,526 430,526 430,526 
R-squared 0.000 0.062 0.003 0.064 
AIC -404925.5 -432833.5 -406149.3 -433487.6 
Dependent Variable: Absolute difference in support and Opposition to Specific Proposition.   
*p>.05;  **p>.01;  ***p>.001 
                                            
12 The Akaike information criterion (AIC) indicates that Model 4 best fits the data. All further interpretation 
will use Model 4.  
13 Results for each specific proposition are available in Appendices C and D. 
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Interestingly, the results from the baseline model show no statistically significant 
relationship between inequality and the distribution of preferences. This may explain 
why previous researchers were unable to confirm the relationship between increasing 
inequality and change in preferences for redistribution. When the results from Table 2.2 
are considered, the relationship is consistent with the theory. Low levels of inequality 
are associated with a high degree of preference uniformity, where a large proportion of 
the population holds similar preferences. These preferences are linked to the median 
income within the population, where much like the examples of Verdugo City and Mount 
Laguna, low inequality low income communities are expected to overwhelming support 
liberal economic policies while low inequality high income communities are expected to 
oppose them. In fact, at the lowest level of inequality, the average expected difference 
in preferences is 17%, equivalent to a vote of 42% to 59%. 
The results from Table 2.2 are displayed graphically in Figure 2.5. The left pane 
in Figure 2.5 is the expected effect of inequality on the distribution of preferences from 
the linear Model 2, while the right pane in Figure 2.5 is the expected effect of inequality 
on the distribution of preferences from the interactive Model 4. As the interpretation of a 
nonlinear polynomial relationship is somewhat difficult with only the calculated 
coefficients, the interpretation will stem from the graphical representation of the 
expected relationship. The results indicate that as inequality levels begin to increase, 
expected preference differences converge. This indicates that as inequality approaches 
middling levels, the distribution of preferences start to become more equal. In fact, once 
community level inequality reaches the median levels for California, distribution of 
preferences reach their most equal level. That is, when all propositions are examined 
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together, the expected difference in the distribution of preferences shrinks to almost 5% 
at middling levels of income inequality. This provides support for Hypothesis 3 and 
indicates that the distributions of preferences are consistent with their theorized 
relationship.  
Figure 2.5. Expected Effects of Income Inequality on Preference Distributions: All 
Liberal Economic Positions (1992-2012) 
 
As levels of inequality start to approach median inequality, preferences start to 
become more normally distributed. Communities with levels of inequality that are close 
to the median inequality for California will have the greatest equality in preferences. 
These results, taken together with the results from Table 2.2, can provide some insight 
on the functional shape of the distribution of preferences with median inequality and 
differing levels of median income. The distribution of preferences at middling income 
appears to be functionally normally distributed with a slight skew in the direction of 
median income. The expected difference in the distribution of preferences for 
communities with median inequality and median income are not discernable from zero. 
In short, communities with median income and inequality, half of the population should 
support liberal economic policies while half of the population should oppose them. This 
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indicates that a community with median income and inequality should have equally, and 
a functionally normal, distributed preferences. This functionally normal distribution is 
expected to skew in the direction of median income when median income is greater, or 
less than, the statewide median. Communities with median inequality and low income 
are expected to have a slight preference advantage for support of liberal economic 
policies while communities with median inequality and high incomes are expected to 
have a slight preference advantage in opposition.  
Figure 2.5 also provides support for Hypothesis 4. Once income inequality 
reaches a critical middling value, additional increases in inequality are expected to 
produce deviations in the distribution of preferences. Figure 2.5 displays this trend 
graphically; when income inequality reaches its highest levels, the distribution of 
preferences converges back to more unequal levels experienced at the lowest levels of 
income inequality. Along with the trends presented in Figure 2.3, the trends in Figure 
2.5 provide a clearer image of the functional form of preference distribution. As a 
community’s level of inequality moves beyond the median, the distribution of 
preferences starts to skew towards the preferences of the lower income stratum. In 
communities with levels of inequality 10% higher than the statewide median, the median 
income must be 1.5 times larger than the statewide median to produce expected levels 
of opposition to liberal economic policies above fifty percent. In communities with 
inequality one standard deviation above the statewide median, only communities with 
median incomes slightly more than twice as large as the statewide median are expected 
to have less than 50% support of liberal economic policies. No communities with 
inequality levels two standard deviations above the statewide median are expected to 
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oppose liberal economic policies.  As inequality levels rise, the distribution of 
preferences starts to skew in support of liberal economic policies, and this effect is 
contingent on the median income of the community.  
 
2.6.3 Median Income, Inequality, and Non-Economic Policies 
It is a possibility that the relationship found in the previous analysis is not specific 
to economic policies, indicating that it could be an effect of some omitted variable or 
artifact of the data generating process. To test this possibility, the same modeling 
technique was performed on a subset of propositions that do not activate economic or 
class based considerations. Although the majority of propositions between 1992 and 
2012 were not framed around the issue of inequality in the media, there is some reason 
to believe that many of them are activating latent economic or class based 
considerations. Forty five percent of all ballot propositions in the sample period were 
focused on changing tax rates or levying bonds for infrastructure improvement. Though 
many of these were not specifically framed as issues of inequality, tax and bond issues 
do activate latent class based considerations (McCaffery and Baron 2006). An 
additional fifteen percent of the propositions focus on issues related to the criminal 
justice system, and issues of this kind are strongly related to class and race/ethnicity 
based considerations (Hagan and Alboneti 1982). A final twelve percent focus on 





Figure 2.6. California Ballot Initiatives with No Economic Frame (1992-2012) 
Election Name Description Outcome 
November 1992 Proposition 159 Establish Auditor General as statewide constitutional officer Defeated 
 Proposition 161 Mentally competent adult may request aid-in-dying Defeated 
 Proposition 164 Term limits on California members of U.S. Senate and U.S. 
House  
Approved 
November 1996 Proposition 215 Exempts patients criminal liability for possessing and growing 
marijuana 
Approved 
November 1998 Proposition 4 Prohibit trapping of fur-bearing animals Approved 
 Proposition 6 Prohibits human consumption of horses Approved 
November 2004 Proposition 59 Public records, open meetings Approved 
 Proposition 70 Tribal gaming compacts Defeated 
November 2008 Proposition 2 Regulations on animal confinement practices Approved 
 Proposition 8 Eliminates the right of same-sex couples to marry Approved 
 Proposition 11 Independent commission to draw legislative district 
boundaries 
Approved 
November 2010 Proposition 19 Legalize and tax marijuana Defeated 
November 2012 Proposition 34 "End the Death Penalty" Defeated 
 Proposition 37 Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Food Defeated 
 
 
Using a coding scheme similar to the one that identified the ballot propositions 
with an inequality frame, this research identified fourteen ballot propositions that should 
not activate class or economic based considerations. The full list of propositions can be 
found in Figure 2.6, but include propositions dealing with term limits, death with dignity, 
and a moratorium on the consumption of horsemeat. The propositions are aggregated 
and then examined for a similar relationship to median income and inequality as the 
propositions that were framed as issues of inequality Table 2.3 provides the results of 
modeling the effects of median income and income inequality on support for these 
issues. The results indicate that they do not respond to levels, or distribution, of 
incomes in the same way that liberal economic policies do. In fact, changes from the 
lowest levels of income, or inequality, to the highest levels do not produce an expected 
change in either support for these policies, or the distribution of preferences, that is 
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distinguishable from zero. These results are consistent across both the baseline(1) and 
interactive(2) models. 
Table 2.3. The Effects of Median Income and Income Inequality on Support for Non-
Economic Policies (All Propositions) 




 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Median family Income  .000 -.000 -.000 -.000 
         (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Income Inequality -.015 -.024 .007 .094 
 (.016) (.033) (.027) (0.104) 
Median Family Income*  .002   
        Income Inequality  (.004)   
Income Inequality2    -0.120 
    (0.125) 
% College graduates .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
% Female .001*** .001*** -.002*** -.002*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
% African American .000*** .000*** -.000 -.000 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
% Latino\a .000** .000** -.001*** -.001*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
% Other .000 .000 -.002** -.002** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
% Democratic Vote 
Share 
.038*** .038*** .076*** .076*** 
 (.013) (.012) (.022) (.022) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -.020** -.020** .001 .001 
 (.009) (.009) (.010) (.010) 
Constant 0.512*** 0.515*** 0.366*** 0.351*** 
 (.013) (.014) (.023) (.033) 
     
Observations 304,791 304,791 304,791 304,791 
R-squared .015 .015 .063 .063 
Dependent Variable: (Support Models): Voteshare in Support of Liberal 
Economic Policies; (Distribution Models): Absolute difference in support and 
opposition to Specific Proposition.   





Figure 2.7. Expected Effects of Median Income and Income Inequality on Preference 
Distributions, All Non-Economic Positions (1992-2012) 
 
  
Figure 2.7 graphically represents the results from the interactive models(2) from 
Table 2.3, shoeing both the baseline and marginal effects of different levels of income 
and inequality. These results provide evidence that the relationship between median 
income and income inequality, and support for redistribution and the distribution of 
preferences is not being caused by an omitted variable or some artifact of the data 
generating process. These results indicate there is something specific to liberal 
economic propositions that connect median income to support for redistribution and 
income inequality to the distribution of preferences.   
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2.7 Conclusion  
The findings from this study indicate that income inequality affects preferences 
for redistributive policies, but not in the way that previous research has expected. 
Changing levels of income inequality is most likely not affecting the preferences of 
individuals at specific points on the economic spectrum, but is affecting the distribution 
of incomes, and thus preferences. When populations become slightly more unequal, the 
distribution of preferences supporting and opposing redistribution become more equal. 
Once inequality reaches a certain point, higher levels of inequality experience a 
divergence of preferences. This is likely due to the distributional qualities of income 
inequality, with high inequality being defined by large populations with relatively meager 
incomes and a small segment of the population with relatively large incomes.  
One of the implications of this research is that rising inequality could potentially 
have an effect on political competition. As preferences become more equally distributed 
within a population, politics can become more competitive, as each side tries to win its 
preferred position in an increasing less safe district. This could lead to some dramatic 
effects, as increased electoral competition often leads to increased mobilization efforts 
and increased participation in elections. If increasing inequality is producing an 
environment where more people are coming out to vote, this could potentially lead to 
policy enactments that favor the lower economic stratum, and potentially lead to a 
decrease in income inequality. When inequality increases, the proportion of the 
population below the mean income increases, moving the median and mean incomes 
apart. When this happens, the proportion of the population that could benefit from 
redistribution, the proportion of the population below the mean, increases.  Additionally, 
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since the poorer classes vote at much lower rates than wealthier classes, there is a 
greater possibility to mobilize those populations, and increased competition could lead 
to greater representation for the poor.  
All of these trends could lead initial increases in income inequality to produce 
greater participation and representation. However, once that middling value for 
inequality is reached, additional inequality leads to lower levels of competition, and thus 
lower levels of mobilization and participation. The potential problem with this scenario is 
that in these populations, the voting population will skew towards the top of the income 
distribution, to those who do not benefit from redistribution, and the overall effect could 
be fewer policies aimed at inequality, and thus more inequality. This could lead to a 
potential inequality trap, which causes inequality to breed additional inequality. 
The results from the analysis may also provide some insight as to why previous 
researchers have found that increasing income inequality leads to increasing 
representative inequality. As inequality begins to increase, the distribution of 
preferences begins to become equal, and this may provide representatives greater 
choice in the preferences they hold. Ostensibly, when a population has a 
disproportionate preference, where a large proportion of the population supports or 
opposes a policy, their elected representative should also hold that preference, as not 
doing so may hinder their future electoral fortunes. However, when the preferences of 
the population are split, the representative has more leeway in preference holding. In 
these situations, segments of the population may be able to use resources outside of 
their voting ranks, such as large campaign contributions or personal sway, to motivate 
representatives to their preference positions. In this situation, the preferences of the 
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wealthy should become more representative, as has been shown in previous literature 
(Bartels 2008), and representation becomes more unequal. 
Finally, as previous researchers have been unable to determine the relationship 
between inequality and preferences, this research provides some additional insights. 
Previous researchers attempting to find a linear relationship between inequality and 
preferences have overlooked the possibility of a curvilinear relationship. Preference 






A COMPETITION THEORY OF THE EFFECTS OF INCOME INEQUALITY ON 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
3.1 Chapter Abstract  
Previous research on the relationship between income inequality and political 
participation finds that societies with the greatest income equality often have the highest 
levels of participation, while the most unequal populations often have the lowest levels 
of participation. While these studies specify the relationship between inequality and 
participation as linear, there are reasons to believe that changes in inequality affect 
rates of political participation contingent on both the size of the change as well as the 
current levels of inequality affecting the population experiencing change. Using 
community level voting data in California from 1992 to 2012 and accounting for the 
spatial components of participation and income, this paper provides evidence that the 
effects of income inequality on participation depends on the current levels of, and size 
of change in, income inequality. This paper finds that increases in income inequality 
actually increase participation in economically homogeneous populations, likely due to 
increases in political conflict and mobilization, while increases in income inequality in 
highly unequal populations decrease participation, because of the decreasing 
competitiveness and relative power differences inherent to highly unequal populations.  
This finding suggests that previous research, which treats this relationship as linear, 
may be misinterpreting the effect of increasing income inequality on political 




3.2 Introduction  
Most objective economic measures have indicated a significant increase in 
income inequality over the last half of the 20th Century (Piketty and Saez 2014). In 
December 2013, President Barack Obama called economic inequality “the defining 
challenge of our time” and indicated that the political consequences of letting economic 
inequality increase unfettered would produce political consequences, which could be 
detrimental to American democracy. Income inequality, or the disparity between 
individuals at different places within the economic spectrum, has been exacerbated 
during the post-2008 Great Recession (Cynamon and Fazzari 2015). The Gini 
coefficient, an often-used measure of income inequality, has increased from a low of 
.314 in 1967 to .406 in 201714, an increase of almost 30%. In terms of real income 
disparity, the top one percent of income earners in 2016 made 22.5 percent of all pre-
tax income, up from 8.9 percent in 1976 and marking its highest level in almost 100 
years (Piketty and Saez 2003). After adjusting for inflation, median household incomes 
have declined almost ten percent since 2000 (US Census Bureau 2013). 
The rise in income inequality, associated with an increase in the economic 
disparity between the haves and the have-nots, has corresponded to a dramatic 
decrease in political participation, especially among the have-nots. The 2004 American 
Political Science Association’s taskforce on rising income inequality postulated that 
American progress towards realizing an ideal of truly representative government may be 
in digress. They concluded that the voices of Americans are being raised and heard 
                                            
14 Data are based on primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and 
World Bank country departments. 
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unequally (Jacobs et al. 2004). In fact, class bias has been persistent, and increasing, in 
American politics, where voter participation has been low and increasingly biased 
toward the wealthy (Solt 2010; Wichowsky 2012; Franko, Kelly, and Witko 2016). The 
goal of this study is to interpret several existing, and at times conflicting, theories of 
income inequality and political participation, and show how each of the existing models 
can simultaneously co-exist in a logically consistent manner. This research will show 
that when the three theoretical mechanisms that link income inequality to political 
participation are examined together, income inequality has an inverted U shaped 
relationship to political participation, not a linear one as previous research has 
assumed.    
In section three, this paper addresses three theoretical models that have been 
used to explain the relationship between income inequality and political participation, 
and highlights the individual shortcomings for each model.  Section four develops a new 
competition theory of participation that integrates aspects of all three theoretical models 
and shows how income inequality has a non-linear relationship with political 
participation. Section five develops a modeling structure to test the theory and explain 
the data used. Section six presents the results and interpretation. Section seven offers 
concluding remarks and insights. 
 
3.3 Previous Models of Income Inequality and Participation 
Previous scholars have identified three potential models for the interaction of 
rising income inequality and participation; relative power theory, conflict theory, and 
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resource theory. Each of these models stipulates a slightly different expected 
relationship.  
 
3.3.1 Relative Power Theory 
Relative power theory states that income inequality should decrease the levels of 
political participation generally, but that effect should be greatest for the poor due to an 
unequal distribution of power. As a population becomes more economically disparate, 
those on the higher end of the economic spectrum have more power, relative to those 
on the bottom, and use it for electoral success. Since power is unevenly distributed, 
participation decreases due to noncompetitive elections (Hill and Leighley 1992)15.  
Researchers, using aggregated measures of income inequality, have shown that overall 
levels of participation decrease in populations with higher levels of income inequality 
(Brady 2004; Solt 2008).  
Participation is directly affected by the perceived responsiveness of 
representatives to their constituents, when senators are more responsive to constituents 
with higher incomes (Goodin and Dryzek 1980), political efficacy should decline among 
poorer members of the population leading to decreases in participation. This research 
goes beyond a simple “access equals influence” model by showing that increasing 
income inequality decreases the participation of the lowest income strata by diminishing 
perceived returns from participation (Wichowsky 2012). Gilens (2005) finds that the 
representatives’ usually favor the preferences of the wealthier classes, although he 
                                            
15 See also Dye (1969), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) and Wachowsky (2012) who show that an 
increase in income inequality is associated with a reduction in party competition, voter participation, and 
an increase in income bias as parties are less able to mobilize less advantaged citizens. 
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notes that different economic classes do not always disagree about policy preferences. 
However, when they do, the preferences of representatives’ favor the wealthier classes. 
Income inequality decreases political participation by reducing the amount of 
politically relevant resources available to the majority of constituents (Brady 2004). 
Additionally, income bias in the electorate can lead to even greater levels of income 
inequality (Avery 2016; Franko et al. 2016). When members of higher economic classes 
participate disproportionately more in politics than members of lower classes, rates of 
income inequality increase. This leads to a systematic collection of politically relevant 
resources at the top of the income spectrum, and political power becomes unevenly 
distributed. When resources are concentrated among fewer people, the participatory 
abilities of the majority are affected (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). Though this theory 
contends that increasing income inequality decreases overall levels of political 
participation, individuals with higher incomes are affected less than those in the lowest 
income brackets. 
Relative power theory is limited because the theorized causal mechanism, 
unequal distribution of power, does not lend itself to direct empirical testing. 
Researchers have tested this theory using proxy variables such as feelings of efficacy 
(Goodin and Dryzek 1980), or political resources (Brady 2004), yet this theory appears 
to be an ex post facto explanation as to why rising income inequality decreases political 
participation. The problem arising from this theoretical frame is that the causal 
mechanism remains ambiguous. 
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3.3.2 Conflict Theory 
Conflict theory contends that income inequality should increase levels of political 
participation for all income groups, as people compete for the control of government 
resources. When income inequality increases, the economic preferences of the rich and 
the poor diverge, and involvement in government becomes a more attractive means to 
improve one’s economic circumstances (Meltzer and Richards 1981; Hayes 2014; 
Franko 2016). Because the economic incentives to participation becomes greater when 
inequality increases, both the well-off and less well-off will increase mobilization efforts 
to seek their preferred policies (Page and Jacobs 2009), which increases participation. 
Conflict theory claims that the competition over the available resources should increase 
overall participation rates both from the bottom-up as well as the top-down.  
When there is greater demand for control over government benefits, political 
participation increases as a result of increased political competition (Kelly 2009; 
Neckerman and Torche 2007,).  Competition often increases as the relative difference 
in incomes between the poor and the well-off increases because both the nature and 
type of benefits desired by different classes become more opposed (Page and Jacobs 
2009). Wealthier Americans show substantially lower levels of support for policies 
designed to reduce income inequality, or its substantial effects (Gilens 2009; Enns and 
Wlezien 2011; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016). For instance, as income inequality 
increases, voters below the mean income should show greater support for 
redistribution, such as tax and transfer policies or supply side economic policies like 
increasing the top marginal and corporate tax rates.  Thus, as income inequality 
increases so will participation. 
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The limitation to conflict theory is that empirical testing has yet to find a 
significant increase in participation as a result of increased income inequality, and thus 
has yet to show evidence for this theoretical approach. There are a few potential causes 
for this. First, conflict theory is predicated on the idea that increasing inequality will 
cause a divergence in class preferences where the haves want something starkly 
different from the have-nots. However, even though Americans are aware of rising 
inequality, no great divergence in preferences has been identified (Bartels 2005; McCall 
2013). Even though we should see an increase in support for redistribution policies, 
such as increased welfare, social spending, or minimum wage laws because of 
increased inequality, we do not (McCall 2013). This is potentially the case of individuals 
largely being unable to connect inequality and public policy (Bartels 2005), or inequality 
not being a concern large enough to change values like individualism that underlie 
individuals’ preferences for redistribution (Bobo 1991; Feldman 1999; Page and Jacobs 
2009). Second, it is possible that increasing inequality increases turnout at the ends of 
the economic spectrum and decreases turnout in the middle (Stockemer and Parent 
2014). Since the trade-offs between lower taxes and more redistribution would be 
relatively inconsequential to the middle of the economic distribution a non-linear u 
shaped participation curve could develop. Traditional linear testing would treat this non-
linear relationship as a non-relationship. 
Additionally, conflict theory is conditioned on class interaction. Members of 
different socioeconomic classes must feel that they are in direct competition with each 
other over policy outcomes and benefits. However, increasing income inequality has 
also lead to increasing income segregation. Economic segregation, the level of 
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interaction between individuals of different classes, has continued to increase over the 
last few decades, which may mitigate potential changes in voter turnout (Galbraith and 
Hale 2008). When members of different classes stay segregated, they lack the 
experiential knowledge that enables them to identify conflicts within the political realm. 
 
3.3.3 Resource Theory 
Resource theory contends that income inequality affects levels of political 
participation by altering the levels of politically relevant resources available to the 
masses, such as political interest and knowledge, financial resources, and time. This 
produces an income bias in the electorate, where those with greater levels of resources 
participate to a greater degree than poorer citizens. The decline in participation is based 
on the poorest citizen’s relative lack of politically relevant resources, which are required 
for participation (Solt 2010). A relative resource advantage, as measured by 
unemployment, poverty, and financial well-being, decreased voter turnout for the poor 
(Rosenstone 1982; Lim and Sander 2012). More recent research has attributed this 
effect to a person’s placement within an economic stratum, producing an income bias in 
the electorate (Bartels 2008; Leighley and Nagler 2013), which has a crosscutting effect 
on turnout (Verba et al. 1995; Solt 2010; Avery 2015).  
Direct empirical testing of this hypothesis has shown that increased income 
inequality does produce an income bias in the electorate and citizens in the highest 
income quintile are much more likely to vote than those in the lowest quintile (Solt 2010; 
Leighley and Nagler 2013). These researchers conclude that it is an inability, or lack of 
desire, to pay the real costs, time and money, inherent to participation, and thus the 
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poorer classes participate less. Researchers have also focused on how rising income 
inequality has raised the relative costs to participation (Solt 2010; Soss and Jacobs 
2009), as well as how rising inequality can raise the psychological cost to participation 
(Uslaner and Brown. 2005). 
 
3.4 A Competition Theory of Participation 
The previous models, which explain the relationship between income inequality 
and participation, specify monotonic relationships, or in some cases interactive ones. 
However, there is some reason to believe that the effect that changes in income 
inequality exert on rates of political participation are contingent on both the size of the 
change as well as the current levels of inequality affecting the population under change. 
The primary contribution of this paper is the development of a theory for the relationship 
between income inequality and participation based on political competition, which 
overcomes the shortcoming of previous models. The competition model theorizes a 
curvilinear relationship between inequality and participation, as political competition is 
strongest in populations with middling levels of inequality, and lower in the most 
economically homogeneous. Previous research of the relationship between income 
inequality and political participation (Solt 2008; Kelly and Witko 2012) attempts to 
validate a model of participation which treats the effect of increasing inequality as linear, 
where a change in inequality at any point in the inequality spectrum would produce the 
same expected change in participation. Researchers employing previous theories treat 
the participatory response of populations with near income equality encountering an 
increase in inequality the same as highly unequal populations experiencing the same 
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change, yet there are reasons to believe that this is not the case. Competition theory 
indicates that changes in income inequality should produce differing effects on 
participation based on the pre-existing levels of inequality in the population under 
change, as well as the magnitude of the change in inequality. Therefore, the effect of 
income inequality on participation is a nonlinear effect, not a linear one as previously 
theorized. Competition theory is predicated on the effect that changes in inequality has 
on the distribution of political power, preferences, and resources. This produces three 
independent assumptions concerning the relationship, which is explained below.  
 
3.4.1 Competition Theory 
Competition theory maintains that changes in inequality change the distribution of 
political power of individuals at different points on the economic spectrum. This change 
in the distribution of political power is grounded in the idea that government is more 
responsive to the preferences of individuals higher in the economic distribution.  
Wealthier individual have greater levels of political knowledge (Bartels 2002), better 
economic information (Gilens 2005), and greater availability of politically relevant 
resources, which enable elected representatives to win elections (Mayhew 1974). In 
fact, previous researchers have found that elected representatives are much more 
responsive to the policy preferences of the wealthy than to the poor or even middle-
class (Bartels 2002; Gilens 2005, 2009; Jacobs and Page 2005; Flavin 2012).    
Competition theory differs from relative power theory, as relative power theory 
assumes that changes in inequality at all levels of existing inequality should produce 
equivalent decreases in participation, indifferent to the baseline inequality. However, a 
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small change in income inequality in populations with near income equality would have 
little effect since each individual would likely retain similar levels of relative political 
power, whether high or low. Likewise, a small change in income inequality in highly 
unequal populations would have a similarly small effect on population because political 
power is already highly divided. Therefore, there must be some point in the income 
inequality spectrum where the balance of relative power shifts to the point where the 
relative power of the haves is distinguishable from the power of the have-nots. It is at 
this point in the spectrum that a small change in income inequality could shift relative 
political power and produce a noticeable change in participation.  
Given that the change in participation produced by changing inequality is 
contingent on the baseline levels of inequality, it is clear that a linear monotonic 
relationship between income inequality and political participation is unjustified. There 
are points within the range of potential levels of income inequality where a small change 
in income inequality produces much larger expected changes to participation than at 
other potential levels of income inequality. This leads to the first assumption:  
Assumption 1: The relationship between income inequality and participation is 
non-linear. 
 
Competition theory asserts that populations with different income distributions will 
have different distributions of preferences and differing levels of competition over those 
preferences. Where populations are economically homogeneous, there should be very 
little preference differences, and very little political competition. At higher levels of 
inequality, there will be greater differences in political preferences, greater levels of 
political competition, and greater levels of participation. However, competition theory 
differs from previous models by focusing on the distribution of individuals at different 
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economic positions, not the preferences of individuals at different levels of income 
inequality. Although previous research has failed to show that changing inequality can 
affect the preferences of individuals (Bartels 2005; McCall 2013), inequality researchers 
have overlooked the effect of inequality in changing the distribution of individuals whose 
preferences are in-line with their economic position.  
At higher levels of inequality, the haves become fewer, with more individual 
resources, while the have-nots become greater, with less individual resources, and this 
produces an income bias in preferences. The formation of groups with different 
preferences along economic lines produces an incentive to mobilize co-economic 
constituents to achieve political success. As inequality increases, political preferences 
start to diverge, the proportions of the population at either side of the economic 
spectrum changes, which leads to greater political conflict, which spurs greater 
mobilization efforts and eventually greater participation. Researchers testing the 
assumption that individuals at different economic positions have different preferences 
find that the preferences of members of lower economic classes differ significantly from 
those of high and middle-class Americans (Enns and Wlezien 2011; Avery 2015). 
Additionally, people at the top of the income spectrum have drastically different opinions 
regarding state intervention to redistribute incomes than people at the bottom of the 
income spectrum (Gilens 2009; Franko, Tolbert and Witko 2013; McCall 2013). The 
effects that inequality has on participation is not driven by an increase in the ideological 
space between two preference positions, but the size of the populations that hold 
differing preferences. As individuals almost never have a choice from a full preference 
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spectrum, the scope of the difference in preferences is secondary to the distribution of 
those preferences.  
If we assume a normal distribution in preferences, where members of a 
population are clustered around the median, which has been a long-accepted theorem 
in political science (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957), and has consistently held up to 
empirical testing (Holcome 1980; Congleton 2004), then each side in a political 
competition will seek to occupy the preference space as close to the median as possible 
to increase their coalition size. However, in populations with higher levels of inequality, 
the distribution of preferences skews towards the preferences of individuals at the lower 
end of the economic spectrum. This change produces greater incentive for those 
individuals to mobilize to seek their political preferences. In response, those with 
preferences aligning to the upper end of the income distribution should respond in turn 
by increasing their mobilization efforts to counteract the additional mobilization efforts. 
However, this effect should be strongest where changes in inequality have the ability to 
change the distribution of preferences enough to produce political competition. It is in 
the middle of the income inequality spectrum where an increase in inequality could shift 
the relative power of a minority to a majority position, producing the greatest effect on 
political participation.  
As an example, in populations with near equality of incomes, most if not all of the 
individuals should hold similar preferences and the size of the group with that 
preference would be the majority. A modest increase in income inequality will produce a 
deviation of preferences, and move some individuals from the majority to the minority 
opinion. However, the relative power of the majority should remain unaffected, making 
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mobilization efforts of the majority less important, and the effect on participation should 
be small. It is only once preferences have deviated to the point that the percentage of 
the population holding differing political preferences is equivalent, somewhere in the 
middle of the income inequality spectrum, where mobilization will have its greatest 
influence, political competition will be strongest, and where the largest expected 
increase in participation will result from increasing inequality. However, the relationship 
between levels of inequality and participation should not be monotonic. In populations 
with high levels of income inequality, the separation of individuals between different 
preference groups is already well defined, with both sides engaged in mobilization 
efforts to seek political success. With high levels of income inequality, a modest 
increase in income inequality will not greatly affect mobilization efforts, as they will 
already be in full swing, and the effect on participation will be small. Preferences will be 
most evenly distributed somewhere in the middle of the income inequality distribution, 
and this is where political competition will exert the largest effect on participation rates. 
Given the previous assumption about a non-monotonic relationship, the expected effect 
of income inequality on participation should be non-linear and greatest in the middle of 
the income inequality spectrum, which leads to the second assumption.  
Assumption 2: Neighborhoods with middling levels of inequality participate the 
most. 
 
The previous assumptions start to develop the relationship between income 
inequality and political participation, yet the theory is incomplete because it is yet able to 
specify a functional form of the relationship between income inequality and political 
participation. Income inequality affects the politically relevant resources that are 
available to the citizenry. As inequality increases, the percentage of the population that 
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lacks politically relevant resources increases, and an increasing segment of the 
population is no longer able to afford the costs of political participation. The simple 
causal logic behind this theory exploits a characteristic of income inequality; it is often 
the case that increases in income inequality accompany increases in poverty. The basic 
voting calculus (Riker and Ordeshook 1968) indicates that the likelihood of voting (V) is 
equal to the benefits (B) derived from voting times the probability that by voting, the 
outcome will be affected (P), minus the costs of voting (C): 
R = (BP) – C 
As long as the benefits outweigh the costs, after accounting for the likelihood of 
affecting the election, a vote will take place. However, some are unable to afford the 
costs of voting. This may be in time, money, or information and these individuals will be 
unable to vote irrespective of the potential benefits. This is the case even if the cost of 
voting is unresponsive to the levels of inequality, which there is reason to believe is not 
the case. As inequality increases, the relative political power of individuals higher in the 
economic spectrum increases, which increases their collective political power. This 
increase in collective political power decreases the political power of individuals at lower 
levels on the economic spectrum, and makes participation more costly as they have to 
compete with wealthier classes for representation. However, as inequality increases, 
the expected benefits of participation will also increase. As the distribution of incomes 
become more unequal, there are greater potential benefits for a larger segment of the 
population in terms of redistributive policies. These effects are compounded by the 
increasing proportion of the population at lower levels on the economic spectrum when 
inequality is high, indicating that the proportion of low SES individuals will increase 
66 
 
when inequality goes up. The likelihood that a person votes when they are unable to 
afford the costs of voting is low, and so when the percentage of individuals in a 
population with low SES increases, voting will decline. 
Although income inequality does not fully specify the socioeconomic composition 
of a population directly, we can make some assumptions, especially at higher levels of 
income inequality. On the one-hand, low levels of income inequality provide very little 
information concerning the socioeconomic status of members of the population. For 
instance, the Gini coefficient for census block-groups in Beverly Hills California, one of 
its wealthier neighborhoods, are similar to that of block-groups in south-central Los 
Angeles, one of California’s poorest areas. This is due to the socioeconomic 
homogeneity of the population. On the other hand, high levels of income inequality do 
provide information concerning the socioeconomic status of the population. At the 
highest levels of inequality, the population would be defined by a very few number of 
very wealthy individuals and large numbers of very poor individuals. Therefore, the 
likelihood that a person is of low socioeconomic status increases, in the aggregate, as 
income inequality increases. Therefore, the probability that an individual is unable to 
pay the costs of participation increases as income inequality increases, and as income 
inequality increases, political participation should decrease. This leads to the third 
assumption: 
Assumption 3: When income inequality is highest, the least participate.  
 
 
3.4.2 Hypotheses  
Given the three assumptions, participation should increase as inequality 
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increases, as it drives the proportion of the population holding divergent preferences 
towards parity. This parity in preferences increases political competition, which in turn 
drives mobilization and participation. As competition increases with an increase in 
inequality, the costs of participation also increase, due to the resulting imbalance of 
power between the rich and the poor and the increasing proportion of the population 
that can no longer afford to participate. Once inequality hits a critical point, the rising 
costs to participation leads to fewer people at the bottom of the income distribution 
participating, decreases political competition, decreased mobilization, which further 
decreases participation. As populations experience high levels of participation, the 
mobilization effects will give way to differences in relative power and resources, 
decreasing participation, and participation will reach its lowest rates. This theory is 
presented graphically in Figure 3.1. 





This theory produces three testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.1: Income inequality will have a curvilinear effect on political participation 
Hypothesis 3.2: As income inequality increases from its lowest levels, political 
participation will increase 
Hypothesis 3.3: Once income inequality reaches a critical value, increases in inequality 
will produce decreases in political participation 
 
3.5 Data and Methods 
To test these hypotheses I employ election and demographic data at the census 
block-group level in the state of California from 1992-2012. This method produces 
between 21,000 and 22,000 observations per year, which is much larger than previous 
studies. Research at the census tract level will allow for a greater variation of political 
and socioeconomic contexts, and allow this research to control for the spatial nature of 
voting behavior, as previous studies have found high levels of global and local spatial 
autocorrelation in regional income dispersions (Rey and Montouri 1999). Thus, this 
research will employ spatial regression analysis. The information on economic makeup 
at the census block level is available through the California Secretary of State’s office in 
concert with the U.S. Census Bureau and California Department of State.  
 
3.5.1 Data 
The primary dependent variable for participation is census block voter 
participation. Previous research has attempted to examine the effects of income 
inequality on multiple measures of participation, however only voting participation is 
available at the micro-level employed in this study. This analysis will focus on the 
percentage of the census block that voted, and will remain indifferent to the direction of 
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their vote. Though examining the way that individuals in these blocks vote may provide 
meaningful insights to the existing literature, these insights will be left for future 
researchers to identify. Voter turnout is measured as the number of individuals in the 
census block-group that cast a vote for the proposition divided by the voting eligible 
population (VEP). Previous researchers who focus on voting rates have disagreed as to 
whether examining the percentage of the voting age population (VAP) or VEP is most 
appropriate (McDonald and Popkin 2001), but previous research has indicated that 
focusing on the VEP is the most appropriate measure for state-level turnout (Holbrook 
and Heidbreder 2010).  
The primary independent variable is a measure of income inequality at the 
community level. There are some reasons to believe that measuring inequality at the 
community level is the most appropriate measure of inequality as it most closely mirrors 
the levels of inequality actually experienced by individuals. A Gini coefficient for income 
inequality is generated from income responses to the American community, aggregated 
to the census-block level, for the respective years, producing a Gini coefficient for each 
block-group-year.  The Gini coefficient, an often used measure of income inequality, 
which is “exactly one half of the relative mean difference, which is defined as the 
arithmetic average of the absolute values of differences between all pairs of incomes” 
(Sen 1997, 30-31).16 A value of 1 would mean that one person made all of the income 
and all others earned nothing, where a Gini value of zero would indicate that all 
                                            
16 The Gini coefficient can be generated for any population of income values. The Gini coefficient is 
expressed as a numerical value, between 0 and 1, corresponding to a Lorenz curve, where each income 
is ranked from lowest to highest along the horizontal axis and the percentage of the whole economic 
stratum accumulated by that segment of the population along the vertical axis. 
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members of the population made exactly the same amount. Mathematically the Gini 
coefficient can be derived from the formula: 






Where G is the Gini coefficient, n is the population size, μ is the population 
variance, yi is the specific income and yj is all other incomes. The Gini coefficient has a 
few beneficial attributes; it is decomposable, it is independent of income scale and 
population size, and is bound between zero and one (Cowell 2010).  Over the sample, 
the Gini coefficient ranges from .204 to .670 with a mean of .362 and a standard 
deviation of .069. The size of the population for the block-groups ranges from 4 to 
39,248 with a mean of 1550 and a standard deviation of 930. Census block-group 
measures of income inequality for California are mapped in Figure 3.2. 
The model includes a number of control variables measured at the block-group 
level. These controls include median family income, college graduation rates, gender 
composition, ethnic composition, difference in the two-party vote share, and ethnic 
fractionalization. Socioeconomic status (SES) is a known determinant of voting behavior 
(Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995), since it can increase resources necessary to vote 
such as time, money, and civic skills. Previous studies have used income and education 
as a proxy for socioeconomic status. This study follows previous research and employs 
both median family income and the percentage of residents 25 or older who are college 
graduates as a proxy for SES.  Both of these measures come from the US Census 
Bureau’s American Community Survey. To control for demographic features, the 
analysis controls for the percentage of the population that are female and the 
percentage of the population which identify as Anglo, African-American, Latino/a, and  
71 
 
other, with percentage white being the omitted category. This data is from the US 
Census Bureau.  




Intergroup conflict, rather than economic conflict, can increase political 
participation (Tolbert and Grummel 2003), especially for Anglos, so this study employs a 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of racial concentration for each block-group. The 
HHI is a sum of the squared percentage of each racial group that makes up the 
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population total, producing a 0-1 index of the concentration of a single racial/ethnic 





where pi is the fractional share of racial/ethic group i and n is the total number of 
racial/ethnic groups within the population. The HHI is a 0-1 index indicating the 
concentration of a population on a single firm, in this case a political party. A value of 
one indicates that all residents identify as the same racial/ethnic group, and as the value 
decreases to zero, the degree of racial/ethnic dispersion increases. This is a common 
metric used to measure the degree of ethnic homogeneity/ heterogeneity at the nation 
state level (see Anderson and Paskeviciute 1997).    
One of the most important factors in determining voter turnout is the 
competitiveness of the election (Geys 2006). When elections are closer, mobilization 
efforts often increase, as each side sees their ability to win increase. To control for 
electoral competitiveness, the absolute difference in two-party vote share is included. 
Smaller values indicate closer elections, and increased voter turnout is expected.   
There are two distinct forms of spatial autoregressive models, error dependence 
and lag dependence, and the specific model used depends on the nature of the spatial 
dependence. Starting with the OLS model: 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀 
where y is a N × 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, X is a N × K matrix 
of observations on K independent variables, β is a K × 1 vector of regression 
coefficients, and ɛ is a N × 1 vector of errors assumed to be normally and independently 
distributed (Anselin and Rey 1991). In the spatial error model the errors can no longer 
73 
 
be assumed independent and identically distributed and the regression model takes the 
following form 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + λWε + τ 
where λ is the spatial autoregression coefficient, W is a N × N matrix of spatial weights 
representing the geography of the observational units, and τ is a N × 1 vector of errors 
assumed to possess the usual properties. In this form, spatial dependence influences 
the error term only and it has been shown to influence the power of tests for 
heteroscedasticity and the structural stability of regression coefficients (Anselin and Rey 
1991). 
In the spatial lag model, the standard regression equation may be rewritten as 
𝑦𝑦 = γWy + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + τ 
where γ is the spatial autoregression coefficient. In this form, the value of the dependent 
variable at a particular location is jointly determined by its values at other locations and 
OLS estimation is no longer consistent (Anselin and Rey 1991). For both the lag and 
error models, the regression equation is solved using maximum likelihood estimation 
(Anselin and Getis 1992). 
 
3.6 Results and Interpretation 
The results of the spatial regression models17 for all elections between 1992 and 
2012 are presented in Table 3.1 and indicate, as theorized, the relationship between 
income inequality and participation does not appear to be linear. The results from the 
                                            
17 The results are presented using a spatial lag model. As a robustness check, the models were run using 
both OLS and a spatial error model. The results from OLS and a spatial error model are presented in 
Appendices E and F respectively and the results are similar to the spatial lag models.  
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linear relationship do not reach traditional levels of significance; however, the curvilinear 
model does indicate a strong and substantive relationship.  
Table 3.1. Effects of Income Inequality on Political Participation (Lag Model) 
 (Linear) (Curvilinear) 
 Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) 
Vote %t-1 .981*** (.034) .987*** (.033) 
Gini Coefficient .018 (.024) .701*** (.100) 
Gini Coefficient2   -.945*** (.122) 
% College Educated .004*** (.001) .005*** (.001) 
% Female .001*** (.000) .001*** (.000) 
Median Family Income .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
% African American -.001*** (.000) -.001** (.000) 
% Latina/o -.002*** (.000) -.002*** (.000) 
% Other Race/Ethnicity -.004* (.002) -.004* (.002) 
2 Party Vote Share .011 (.017) .013 (.016) 
Ethnic Fractionalization .099*** (.013) .098*** (.013) 
Constant .384*** (.027) .270*** (.025) 
N 419,096  419,096  
Elections 21  21  
Adj R-squared .165  .167  
Dependent Variable: Census Block Voting Percentage. All regressions include a lagged 
dependent variable and a dummy variable for election type.  
Significance level: * p<.05;  ** p<.01;  *** p<.001 
 
The positive and statistically significant coefficients for the Gini coefficient, in the 
curvilinear model, indicate that as income inequality increases, so does political 
participation. When levels of income inequality increase from low levels, the rate of 
political participation also increases. Though the increased level of participation, as an 
effect of increasing income inequality, varies by election, the average expected rate of 
increase is about 3.5% per standard deviation increase in income inequality. Increasing 
income inequality appears to have a greater influence on participation in general and 
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special elections, with a smaller effect for primary elections18. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient for the squared term, in the curvilinear model, indicate 
that income inequality has a curvilinear relationship to political participation, and as 
income inequality reaches higher rates, the effect becomes negative. This finding 
provides support for Hypothesis 1. Due to the difficulty with interpreting the effects of an 
interaction based on the coefficients alone, the interactive effect is graphed in Figure 
3.3. 
Figure 3.3 graphs the interactive effect of income inequality on political 
participation. As expected, the interactive effect indicates that the expected rates of 
participation increase as income inequality increases from low to middling levels. The 
largest expected increases in participation appear as income inequality begins to 
increase from the lowest levels, which provides support for Hypothesis 2. However, 
once income inequality reaches middling levels, the effect of additional increases on 
income inequality become negative. The expected rate of participatory decline appears 
as inequality reaches its highest levels, which provides support for Hypothesis 3. For 
the majority of elections, the lowest rates of participation are expected at the lowest and 
highest levels of income inequality. These findings indicate that as income inequality 
increases from low levels, differences in preferences form over the appropriate policy 
decisions and allocation of benefits, generating conflict that leads to additional 
participation. Once income inequality reaches middling levels, the relative power of the 
haves increases over the have-nots and participation declines. As income inequality 
                                            
18 This is consistent with literature on primary elections (see Polsby and Wildavsky 1978; Norrander 1989; 
Rapoport 1994 among others ) where participation in primary elections is driven by political interest, 
especially among extreme partisans, and not by economic factors.  
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increases towards its highest levels, fewer people will be able to pay the costs of 
participation, and participation declines. These findings indicate that any study of the 
effects of income inequality on political participation needs to account for the all three 
models of political participation, and its curvilinear relationship with income inequality. 
Figure 3.3. Effects of Increasing Income Inequality on Political Participation  
(All elections 1992-2012) 
 
A number of control variables reach statistical significance, and provides 
additional support for research on the effects on economic, political, and demographic 
characteristics on participation rates. A number of them deserve recognition. In the 
majority of the models, the percentage of college graduates has a positive effect on 
participation, indicating that a more educated population participates more. I find 
differing effect of the ethnic categories on participation, indicating that these populations 
may be mobilized at different rates depending on the election, and the particular 
candidates or policies being voted on. Additionally, political competitiveness also shows 
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mixed results, indicating that how close an election is may not always produce greater 
levels of participation. Finally, the ethnic fractionalization variable is almost always 
positive, which provides support for the idea that populations with greater ethnic 
diversity participate at greater levels. 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
This research indicates that increasing income inequality has a curvilinear 
relationship with political participation, where the effect of inequality is dependent on 
both the magnitude of change and the pre-existing levels of inequality in the population 
experiencing a change in inequality. Previous researchers have examined the 
relationship between income inequality and political participation motivated by a single 
theoretical model. Employing the relative power model, Goodin and Dryzek (1980) and 
Brady (2004) find that increasing income inequality reduces political participation by 
reducing the relative resources or political efficacy of individuals living in highly unequal 
economic contexts. Kelly and Witko (2012), and Stockemer and Parent (2014) find 
limited support for the conflict theory, indicating that under limited circumstances income 
inequality can increase political participation. Finally, Solt (2010), and Soss and Jacobs 
(2009) indicate that as income inequality increases, politically relevant resources 
decline, especially amongst the poorest members of a population. However, no 
previous study was able to produce results that explained the relationship between 
income inequality and political participation under all circumstances. The logic 
presented in this study is that research on the relationship between income inequality 
and political participation must account for the effect of income inequality on political 
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participation, which is dependent on both the size of the change and the pre-existing 
levels of inequality in a population.   
One of the implications of this research is that individuals living in the highest 
inequality context may no longer have the ability to pursue an approach to reducing 
income inequality that depends on signaling policy makers through democratic action. 
At the highest levels of inequality, participation reaches its lowest level, and is 
increasingly biased towards the wealthy. This class-bias leads to a less equitable 
balance of power between the haves and the have-nots, affects the substance of 
economic policy, has real and lasting effects on distributional outcomes, and can make 
inequality even worse (Franko, Kelly, and Witko 2016). The result of this cyclical 
process is, as Bénabou (2011) points out, high inequality populations that reinforce 
higher levels of inequality. 
One of the limitations of this paper is that it examines only a single state, and 
only focuses on a single measure of participation. Although, as indicated above, there is 
good reason to expect that California is a good proxy for the rest of the nation as it 
includes populations that exist throughout the United States. This research represents 
the first study of its kind to examine the relationship between income inequality and 
political participation at such a fine level of geography, while accounting for the spatial 
components of both income inequality and political participation. Though this study does 





FROM THE POORHOUSE TO THE VOTING BOOTH: THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY AND RACE OR ETHNICITY ON VOTING 
4.1 Chapter Abstract 
Recent research has shown that increasing economic inequality in America has 
led to decreasing levels of political participation in the form of voting. Additionally, 
reduced levels of voting have occurred unevenly by class, with the largest decreases 
coming from the poor and middle class. However, these studies have treated all 
Americans the same while not accounting for the possibility of different responses to 
increasing income inequality from different racial and ethnic groups. Examining 
neighborhood voting rates, and levels of income inequality, from 1992 to 2012, and 
utilizing spatial regression modeling, this paper shows that different racial/ethnic groups 
respond to changing levels of income inequality differently. Only the poor Anglo majority 
responds by becoming increasingly disenfranchised while African Americans, and to a 
lesser extent Latina/os, respond with increasing participation. This finding emphasizes 
the importance of the interaction between race, ethnicity, and economic inequality and 
suggests that the lack of social capital within the poor Anglo community is driving the 
lower levels of voter turnout identified in previous research. 
 
4.2 Introduction  
Rising income inequality has been one of the defining trends of the past 
generation, yet we know little about the impact that it has on the participatory 
tendencies of most Americans. Previous researchers have asserted that as economic 
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inequality increases, the conflict inherent in the clash between income groups should 
increase people’s engagement in politics (Meltzer and Richards 1981; Oliver 2001). As 
the classes move farther apart economically, class preferences over the allocation of 
governmental resources will also diverge. This divide in preferences should lead to 
higher rates of contentious debate between the classes and fuel mobilization efforts 
leading to higher turnout. The result of this process should be increased participation 
among the wealthy and the poor. However, recent scholarship has found that increased 
inequality appears to depresses turnout, especially among the poor (Bartels 2009; 
Brady 2004; Gilens 2005; Solt 2010), raised the relative costs to participation (Solt 
2008; Solt 2010; Soss and Jacobs 2009), and increased participations’ psychological 
costs (Goodin and Dryzek 1980; Uslaner and Brown 2005). However, previous literature 
has failed to account for the diverse responses that different racial/ethnic/economic 
groups have to increasing income inequality.  
The poor, especially the poor in populations with greater levels of economic 
inequality, participate at a much lower rate than do the wealthy. However, there is 
reason to believe that this finding may not be true for all groups within society. Recent 
research in social capital indicates that the existence of strong in-group associations, 
either through a feeling of linked fate or social consciousness, can cause individuals to 
act on behalf of the improvement of the group (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Mason 1997; La 
Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998). If income inequality can depress voter participation and 
social capital can improve it, this implies that as economic conditions deteriorate for a 
group, the level of in-group associations will condition the level of response. The reason 
America has not seen increased participation among the poor, resulting from increasing 
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inequality, is that being poor is not a social organizational factor strong enough to 
develop strong group attachments as people do not see a benefit from being a member 
of this group (Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002). Being poor alone does not produce in-
group connectivity or a desire to work for the betterment of the group. However, race 
and ethnic politics research presents a compelling case that minority groups in America 
have strong in-group attachments, and often behave in a manner consistent with in-
group improvement (Dawson 1994; Sullivan and Winburn 2010). This indicates that 
minority groups may have the social tools necessary to escape the inequality trap, 
where poor Anglos may not.   
Though this research will not test the effects of social solidarity directly, it will 
propose it as the theoretical causal mechanism that motivates groups to respond to 
rising economic inequality differently. The primary reason that this research does not 
directly test the social connectedness hypothesis is twofold. The first, and simplest, 
reason is that no sufficient data at the appropriate level of aggregation exists. The 
second reason is that no consensus on the appropriate measure of social 
connectedness exists. Early research indicated that African Americans participate in 
politics at higher rates than Anglos of similar socioeconomic status (Orum 1966; Verba 
and Nie 1972), and social connectedness within ones ethnic group seemed to give 
minorities an additional source of motivation to participate in politics (Shingles 1981; 
Dawson 1994; Shaw et al. 2000). However, a number of more recent studies employing 
simpler measures of social connectedness concluded that there is no reliable, or reliably 
positive, correlation between social connectedness and political participation for 
minorities (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Lien 1994; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewet 1989; 
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Verba et al. 1995). The more recent findings can be interpreted as an indication that 
group solidarity is no longer as strong of a motivator in America as it once was. Some 
research indicates that this is an effect of race losing its political significance as the 
social status of many minorities increase (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Verba et al. 1995). 
However, others argue that most measures of social connectedness are too 
endogenous to participation behaviors to appropriately separate (Chong and Rogers 
2005; Putnam 1995). Chong and Rodgers (2005) concludes that first, researchers have 
not taken sufficient account of the heterogeneity of group-centered opinions and 
feelings of solidarity, in minority populations, which may motivate minority populations to 
increase political interests and participation in politics; and second, that the relationship 
between social connectedness and political participation may not be equal across 
different forms of participation.  
Due to the inherent issues with measuring social connectedness, this research 
plans to test the social connectedness hypotheses through outcomes. Since the 
theoretical underpinning of this research is that social solidarity increases the chances 
that a group will act collectively, this research will examine how groups respond 
differently to their economic and racial context, and how this context affects rates of 
political participation. This analysis, which examines voting rates for neighborhoods in 
California, indicates that under increasing inequality context, racial/ethnic minorities 
respond to increasing economic inequality by increasing their political participation. 
However, this research indicates that while increasing inequality does increase the 
participation of poor African American and Latina/os, the levels of participation for those 
groups never reach levels of participation seen in poor Anglos. While the is not a clear 
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indication of greater levels of social capital at work, it indicates that something, 
potentially higher levels of social capital, helps these groups overcome the income gap 
in participation.  
This finding contributes to the extant literature on the participatory effects of 
economic inequality by questioning the assumption that all groups will respond to the 
changing economic environment equally. Section three will show how economic 
inequality has risen in the last few decades, discuss the current theories for how 
inequality affects participation, and show how some marginalized groups have 
overcome the barriers to participation that increasing economic inequality has fostered. 
Section four will draw on the previous literature to produce a theory explaining how 
different racial/ethnic, and economic minorities respond to changing inequality with 
different patterns of participation and produce testable hypotheses from this theory.  
Data and model specification issues will be discussed in section five. Section six 
presents the results of the analysis. The conclusion and suggestions for further 
research are presented in section seven. 
 
4.3 Inequality and Participation 
4.3.1 Rising Inequality in America 
In 2004, an American Political Science Association taskforce on inequality and 
American democracy found that income inequality in America has been steadily rising 
since the early 1970s (Jacobs et al. 2004), and this trend has increased during the post-
2008 great recession (Jenkins et al. 2012). The Gini coefficient, an often-used measure 
of income inequality, has been steadily rising in the United States from .362 in 1963, to 
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.463 in 2013; an increase of almost 30%. In terms of real income disparity, the top 1% 
of income earners made 23.1% of all pre-tax income in 2015, up from 8.9% in 1976 and 
its highest level in almost 100 years. After adjusting for inflation, median household 
incomes have declined almost 10% since 2000 (Piketty and Saez 2003).  The real 
average hourly wage has remained stagnant since the early 1970s. From 1979 to 2015, 
the top 5% of income earners saw their inflation-adjusted real family income increase 
74.9%, while the bottom 20% saw their real family income decrease by 12.1%, and 
those families between 20% and 40% saw their real family incomes remain unchanged. 
In terms of wealth, the richest 20% of all families control 88.9 of all of the wealth (Wolf 
2012). In terms of consumption inequality, researchers have found that inequalities of 
consumption have been rising along with inequalities of income (Aguiar and Bils 2015; 
Fisher et al. 2013) as wealthier individuals have shifted their spending away from 
necessities and towards luxuries to a greater extent.  
Researchers have developed a number of different theoretical models to account 
for changes in participation as a result of increasing economic inequality. However, 
researchers have failed to come to a consensus on exactly how inequality has affected 
participation rates since they have applied these models to the mass public uniformly. 
This research asserts that groups respond to inequality differently, which explains why a 
consensus has yet to be reached.  The following section will discuss the different 
theoretical models that have been attributed to the effect of economic inequality on 
participation.     
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4.3.2 A Competition Theory of Participation  
The effect that income inequality has on political participation is based on the 
distribution of political power of individuals at different points of the economic spectrum, 
the difference in preferences that is formed as income inequality increases, and the 
proportion of the population that can afford to participate in politics. First, the change in 
the distribution of political power is grounded in the idea that government is more 
responsive to the preferences of individuals higher in the economic distribution.  
Wealthier individual have greater levels of political knowledge (Bartels 2002), better 
economic information (Gilens 2005), and greater availability of politically relevant 
resources, which enable elected representatives to win elections (Mayhew 1974). As 
income inequality increases, the relative political power of the wealthy becomes greater. 
This trend works in unison with the increase in the proportion of the population who is 
poor produced by increasing inequality. A small change in income inequality in 
populations with near income equality would have little effect since each individual 
would likely retain similar levels of relative political power, whether high or low. 
Likewise, a small change in income inequality in highly unequal populations would have 
a similarly small effect on population because political power is already highly divided. 
Therefore, at middling levels of inequality, the increasing disparity in political power will 
have its largest effect on participation.  
Second, groups with different income distributions will have different preferences, 
and opinions, on issues relating to income inequality. Where populations are 
economically homogeneous, there will be very little preference differences, and very 
little political competition. At middling levels of inequality, there will be greater 
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differences in political preferences, greater levels of political competition, and greater 
levels of participation. At higher levels of inequality, the haves become fewer, with more 
individual resources, while the have-nots become greater, with less individual 
resources, and this produces an income bias in preferences. The formation of groups 
with different preferences along economic lines produces an incentive to mobilize co-
economic constituents to achieve political success. As inequality increases, political 
preferences start to diverge, the proportions of the population at either side of the 
economic spectrum changes, which leads to greater political conflict, which spurs 
greater mobilization efforts and eventually greater participation.  
Finally, as inequality increases, the percentage of the population that lacks 
politically relevant resources increases, and an increasing segment of the population is 
no longer able to afford the costs of political participation. Although income inequality 
does not fully specify the socioeconomic composition of a population directly, we can 
make some assumptions, especially at higher levels of income inequality. On the one-
hand, low levels of income inequality provide very little information concerning the 
socioeconomic status of members of the population. On the other hand, high levels of 
income inequality do provide information concerning the socioeconomic status of the 
population. At the highest levels of inequality, the population would be defined by a very 
few number of very wealthy individuals and large numbers of very poor individuals. 
Therefore, the likelihood that a person is of low socioeconomic status increases, taken 
together, as income inequality increases. Therefore, the probability that an individual is 
unable to pay the costs of participation increases as income inequality increases, and 
as income inequality increases, political participation should decrease.  
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4.3.3 Minority Participation 
Researchers often find that African Americans (Shingles 1981; Tate 1991; Verba 
et al. 1993; Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980; Hardy-Fanta 1993), and Latina/os (de la 
Garza et al. 1992; Jackson 2003’ Leighley and Vedlitz 1999), vote at rates higher than 
similarly place Anglos, and much higher than their economic positions would predict 
(Verba et al. 1993). Shingles (1981), finds that African Americans are far more politically 
active, though often with different forms of participation, than Anglos of similar 
socioeconomic status, Shaw et al. (2000) finds similar results for Latina/os. Minority 
groups, who share greater social solidarity, appear to be responding to poor economic 
conditions differently than like Anglos. Thus, we can expect different population groups 
to respond to changes in economic inequality differently, as a result of the greater social 
desirability of reducing inequality. 
Shingles (1981) attributes African American in-group consciousness to political 
mistrust stemming from historical grievances, which also leads to an increased sense of 
internal political efficacy. Together, these attributes can encourage policy-related 
participation. Shaw et al. (2000), finds that socioeconomic status and social-
connectedness dominate Latina/o culture, and produce higher levels of in-group 
consciousness. Dawson (1994) attributes this to the Black Utility Heuristic, where 
African Americans have developed social connectedness to overcome a history of 
subjugation and marginalization. Hero (2003) extends this model to Latina/os and finds 
similar, though less dramatic, results. However, the poor in America have endured high 
levels of political marginalization (Thompson 2012), without increasing levels of in-group 
consciousness.     
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4.4 Different Patterns of Participation 
4.4.1 Different Groups, Different Responses 
For the most part, prior research has not taken sufficient account of the 
heterogeneity of group-centered opinions and feelings of solidarity, in minority 
populations, which may increase the salience of certain issues within minority 
populations and increase participation in politics. In fact, the inconsistency in causal 
findings on the relationship between income inequality and participation is most likely an 
effect of expecting all population groups to respond to inequality in a consistent manner. 
The primary focus of this research hinges on the assertion that different groups within a 
population respond to increases in economic inequality differently. There are three 
reasons why we should expect this trend.    
First, minority populations perceive inequality at completely different rates. To 
demonstrate this trend, I use data from the nationally representative General Social 
Survey (GSS), which is consistent with previously used measures of the perception of 
inequality (McCall and Kenworthy 2009). This data is the best available to assess 
Americans perceptions of rising income inequality as it is the only data that contains 
questions that specifically reference income differences, avoiding issues of inequality 
related to race or gender. This question first appeared in the GSS in 1987, and was 
then replicated in 1992, 1996, 2000, and again in 2008. Although this measure lacks 






Figure 4.1. National Trends in Public Opinion on Income Inequality (by Race/Ethnicity) 
 
Source: General Social Survey (selected years) 
 
Figure 4.1 indicates that African Americans and Latina/os have significantly 
higher perceptions of inequality than Anglos, and that these trends are consistent over 
time. Additionally, these trends indicate that different racial/ethnic groups are 
experiencing changes in inequality at different rates. For instance, between 1992 and 
1996, Latina/os experienced a much more dramatic increase in their perceptions of 
inequality than African Americans and Anglos, however the perception of inequality 
declined after 1996, becoming similar to the rates of perceived inequality in the African 
American population. Anglos show consistently lower perceptions of inequality than 
both African Americans and Latina/os. This trend either indicates that minority’s 
population either reside in areas with greater income inequality, or are more sensitive to 
increases in inequality. Either way, minority populations are expected to respond to 




Figure 4.2. National Trends in Feeling Close to Own Ethnic Group (by Race/Ethnicity) 
 
Source: General Social Survey (selected years) 
 
Second, minority populations have consistently higher levels of in-groups 
attachment, producing higher levels of in-group social capital that enables them to act 
on behalf of the interest of the group (Portney and Berry 1997; Sullivan and Winburn 
2010). Minorities are specifically suited, due to greater in-group consciousness (Dawson 
1994), to see their fates as linked, and have similar preferences to others in their in-
group; as well as act in solidarity to obtain benefits from government. As inequality 
increases, minorities should become increasingly stable in their desire to rectify 
historical grievances and work to redress these inequities. To demonstrate this trend, I 
use data from the GSS to show that minority populations, especially African Americans 
and Latina/os, have higher levels of in-group attachment. 
Figure 4.2 shows trends in the percentage of each racial/ethnic group that feels 
either “close” or “very close” to their ethnic group. African Americans show the highest 
rates of closeness to their co-ethnics, and this trend is consistent across all three years 
the question was asked, and trending upwards. Latina/os show the next highest level of 
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social connectedness, which is also consistent across time, with a small upward trend. 
Anglos show the lowest levels of social connectedness, being lower than both African 
Americans and Latina/os for all years, as well as having no noticeable positive trend. In 
fact, social connectedness amongst Anglos decreased almost 3% between 2004 and 
2012. 
Third, the interaction of these two trends should provide poor minorities 
additional resources to overcome the cost of participation, resources not available to 
poor Anglos. Increasing inequality will produce a divergence in political preferences; 
producing greater conflict over the appropriate course of policy. When this happens, 
minority populations will have a greater incentive to work towards the betterment of the 
group. As inequality increases, the Anglo poor will not have the additional social 
resources to overcome the participation cost. Since engagement with politics requires 
resources, like time, money, and the skills to use time and money effectively (Verba et 
al. 1995), when economic inequality increases, the poor will have relatively fewer of 
these resources and participate less. Due to lower levels of social connectedness, the 
Anglo poor will not have the resources necessary to act as a group. 
 
4.4.2 Roots of Rising Inequality 
Scholars have debated the roots of rising participatory inequality. Most 
preliminary studies of the effects of economic inequality have focused on changes at the 
national level, which has led to inconsistent findings on the relationships between 
inequality and political participation (Solt 2008; Stockemer and Parent 2014; Leighley 
and Nagler 2014). Researchers utilizing state-level inequality measure have added 
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marginal increases to understanding this relationship, by accounting for the role that 
states play in shaping income distributions (Kelly and Witko 2012). Additionally, state-
level research has found that inequality is associated with income segregation 
(Galbraith and Hale 2008) and greater income bias (Lim and Sanders 2012; Avery 
2015), indicating that relative, not absolute, resources affect participation. 
What appears to be missing in the literature is a micro-level analysis of 
inequality. Previous literature has focused on inequality measures at the state and 
federal level that aggregate millions of individuals spread out over thousands of miles. 
This aggregation could miss meaningful local level fluctuations in inequality that could 
have a more meaningful impact on individual behavior. Researchers have examined 
how poverty and inequality has been increasingly concentrated to particular places, 
noting that segregation based on class and race takes shape within and among 
counties, cities, and most notably for this research, neighborhoods (Wilson 1987, 1996; 
Massey and Denton 1993; Rothwell and Domina 2009; Hayes 2018). Inequality affects 
participation rates because it produces significant contextual changes in the social and 
political environments people inhabit (Verba et al. 1995). In short, experiences with 
inequality happen at the community level, through interactions with people who share 
geographic and demographic proximity. 
 
4.4.3 Hypotheses 
Given that this research expects to see different trends in participation arising 
from increasing economic inequality, a number of testable hypotheses arise.  
Hypothesis 4.1: The effect that income inequality has on participation is contingent on 
neighborhood median income 
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Hypothesis 4.2: Predominately Anglo neighborhoods will respond to higher income 
inequality by decreasing participation 
Hypothesis 4.3: Predominately minority neighborhoods will respond to higher income 
inequality by increasing participation 
 
4.5 Data and Methods 
4.5.1 Neighborhood Context 
Analysis of racial inequality and economic inequality on determinants of group 
behavior and preferences rely on the assumption that the racial and economic context 
of a specific geography affect the way that we perceive our surroundings (Baybeck 
2006). Geographical context can capture racial and economic context through multiple 
political jurisdictions. These often include the state (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989), the 
county (Branton and Jones 2005; Soss, Langbein and Metelko 2003), or even the 
municipality (Gainsborough 2001; Welch et al. 2001). Additional research (Oliver and 
Mendelberg 2000; Welch et al. 2001, Cho and Baer 2011) highlights the importance of 
the neighborhood as an appropriate context to study racial or economic predictors of 
political behavior or attitudes.  
This research follows the work of previous researchers who have focused on 
neighborhood units. Previous research that has focused on neighborhoods has 
employed studies over small geographic areas, but this study extends this research to a 
larger geographic region, an entire state. Although California data is somewhat limited 
by data availability along census defined boundaries, which are largely arbitrary 
boundaries, census block-groups are a good proxy for neighborhoods. Census block-
groups are similar in size, population, and number of housing units (Donaldson 2013). 
Donaldson, using the 2009 American Housing Survey, finds that the distance from the 
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typical American’s house to the edge of his or her community is between 520 and 1060 
meters, a distance roughly equal to the radius of one median-sized census block-group. 
He also finds regional differences in neighborhoods, being smaller in the south and 
larger in the Midwest, a finding mirrored in census block-groups. The average census 
block-group has 1532 residence and 605 housing units, which is similar to that of 
neighborhoods in California. Baybeck (2006), in a study motivated by the desire to find 
the appropriate context for analysis, indicates that the block-group does have a 
meaningful impact on political factors. By focusing on the census block-group level, a 
much finer grained level than previous research, this analysis will extend the literature 
beyond national and state level findings. 
Research at the census block-group level will allow for a greater variation of 
racial/ethnic or economic contexts. California, a state of more than 38 million people, 
has only 58 counties and the variation within these counties is somewhat limited. 
California has 710,145 census blocks grouped within 24,057 block-groups, which 
contains a much larger variance in economic trends. Due to the need to aggregate up 
one geographical level to develop a measure of inequality, this research will be done at 
the block-group level.  The information on economic makeup at the census block level is 
available through the California Secretary of State’s office and the US Census Bureau.  
 
4.5.2 Variables 
The dependent variable is a neighborhood measure of participation at the census 
block-group level. Although previous research has attempted to examine the effects of 
economic inequality on multiple measures of participation, only voting information is 
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available at the micro-level employed in this study. This analysis will focus on the 
percentage of the census block that voted. The variable will be constructed by dividing 
the number of individuals in the census block that cast a vote for the proposition by the 
voting eligible population (VEP).  
This analysis will employ three primary independent variables of interest; 
neighborhood median income, neighborhood economic inequality, and racial 
composition. The first independent variable of interest will be the neighborhood’s 
median family income measure at the Census block-group level, which will serve as a 
proxy for the level of absolute resource.  The second independent variable of interest 
will be the neighborhood’s level of economic inequality, measured with a census block-
group Gini Coefficient. The Gini coefficient, an often used measure of economic 
inequality, which is “exactly one half of the relative mean difference, which is defined as 
the arithmetic average of the absolute values of differences between all pairs of 
incomes” (Sen, 1997, 30-31). Mathematically the Gini coefficient can be derived for any 
population of income values from the formula: 
𝐺𝐺 = (1 2𝑛𝑛2𝜇𝜇⁄ )∑ ∑ �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗�𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1   
where G is the Gini coefficient, n is the population size, μ is the population variance, yi 
is the specific income and yj is all other incomes. The Gini coefficient has a few 
beneficial attributes; it is decomposable, it is independent of income scale and 
population size, and is bound between zero and one (Cowell 2010). Since one level of 
aggregation is necessary to generate a Gini coefficient, Gini coefficients will be 
generated for all census block-groups, and analysis will be performed at the block-group 
96 
 
level. A squared term for Gini will also be included to account for the non-linear 
relationship between economic inequality and voting participation.  
The third independent variable of interest will be the neighborhood’s minority 
racial composition. Four categorical dummy variables will correspond each to the 
census block-group’s percentages of Anglo, African American, Latina/o, and other 
populations. In the analysis the variable for Anglo will be excluded as the baseline. 
A number of common control variables, consistent with previous research 
(Garand 2010; Solt 2010; Kelly and Witko 2012), will be used in this analysis. These 
variables include the percent of the population over the age of thirty-five that is college 
educated, and the percent of the population that is female. To account for the 
competitiveness of elections, which can increase overall turnout, a measure of the 
absolute difference in the two party vote share is included. To control for racial threat, a 
measure of ethnic fractionalization is included. This measure is a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index of racial composition constructed from the four racial categories listed above. 
Additionally, since the effect of economic inequality is conditioned on both the location 
of the observation on the economic spectrum as well as the racial composition of that 
observation, a number of interaction terms will be included in the final model.   
 
4.6 Findings 
Table 4.1 presents the results of three separate models of political participation 
based on three different specifications of the interactions indicated by the hypotheses. 
Model 1 excludes all of the specified racial interactions, and primarily focuses on the 
nexus between economic inequality and absolute resources, measured by median 
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family income. This model replicates findings from previous research that examined the 
curvilinear relationship between income inequality and participation (Chapter 3). The 
findings are consistent with previous models, indicating that expected participation is 
lowest in neighborhoods at the high and low extreme levels of inequality, and highest in 
the middle of the income inequality spectrum.  
Model 2 includes interactions between the racial context and the income context, 
as well as between the racial context and the resource context. The findings from Model 
2 indicate that the effect of income inequality is contingent on the proportion of the 
neighborhood that is either Latino or African American, yet would indicate a differing 
relationship. Model 2 indicates that the effect of income inequality in predominantly 
African American Communities is to decrease participation, while it increases 
participation in predominantly Latina/o communities. However, there is reason to believe 
that the absolute level of resources should condition the effect that race and income 
inequality has on participation (see Gilens 2012). 
Model 3 contains all necessary model interactions to produce meaningful insights 
concerning the interaction between economic inequality, placement within the economic 
spectrum, and the racial context. The inclusion of the triple interaction term is both 
specified by the theory and allows for better specification of the effects of increasing 
interpretation difficult. Since the interpretation of a triple interaction term is difficult to 
interpret from calculated coefficients, the interpretation of these relationships will 




Table 4.1. The Effects of Economic Inequality, Median Family Income, and 
Race/Ethnicity on Voting Behavior 
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N 419,096 419,096 419,096 
Elections 21 21 21 
Adj R-squared .478 .479 .483 
Dependent Variable: Census Block Voting Percentage. All regressions include a lagged 
dependent variable and a dummy variable for election type.  





Figure 4.3 presents the results from Model 1 in Table 4.1 and provides support 
for Hypothesis 1. The left panel of Figure 4.3 indicates that political participation is 
higher for wealthier neighborhoods across the entire inequality spectrum. This finding is 
consistent with previous research on this relationship (Rosenstone 1982; Verba et al. 
1995; Lim and Sander 2012; Leighley and Nagler 2013; Avery 2015). Consistent with 
the theory, as economic inequality begins to increase from the lowest levels of 
inequality, participation appears to go up until median inequality is reached. As 
inequality increases past median inequality towards higher levels of inequality, 
participation decreases. However, this decrease is the most pronounced for poor 
neighborhoods. This indicates that inequality is influencing participation rates differently 
for poor and wealthy neighborhoods. The overall effect of increased levels of income 
inequality in wealthy neighborhoods is positive, while the overall effect for poor 
neighborhoods is negative.  
The middle and right pane of Figure 4.3 show the marginal interactive effects that 
income inequality and median family income have on participation rates. As median 
family income increases, the effect of income inequality on neighborhood voting rates is 
increasingly positive. This is true for inequality as well, as income inequality increases, 
the positive effect that median family income has on neighborhood voting rates 
increases. Although this would indicate that minority populations will respond to 
increasing income inequality with decreased voting rates, as many predominantly 
minority neighborhoods have relatively low median family incomes, this model does not 
account for the potentially positive effects of social connectedness. This research now 
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turns to determining if different racial groups respond to higher levels of income 
inequality differently.  
Figure 4.3. Effects of Economic Inequality and Income on Neighborhood Voting Rates19  
 
 
4.6.2 Different Races, Different Reactions 
Figure 4.4 presents results from Model 3 in Table 4.1, and presents predicted 
voting rates based on median family income for mostly Anglo and mostly African 
American neighborhoods20. It is apparent that income inequality is affecting these 
groups differently. In fact, the trends demonstrated in Figure 4.4 provide evidence for 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. At the lowest levels of economic inequality, wealthy mostly Anglo, 
poor mostly Anglo, and wealthy mostly African American neighborhoods all have similar 
levels of expected political participation, while poor mostly African American 
neighborhoods have the lowest levels of political participation. At slightly higher rates of 
                                            
19 Expected values shown with 95% confidence bands.  
20 Neighborhoods that are mostly a single race/ethnicity are defined as neighborhoods which are at least 
80% that race/ethnicity. Results for different years are available in Appendix H.  
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income inequality, poor mostly African American neighborhoods show little change until 
median inequality is reached and then participation increases. Participation stays below 
20% until median rates of economic inequality, and then participation increases to 
almost 40% at the highest rates of economic inequality. However, at no point along the 
inequality spectrum do poor mostly African American neighborhoods reach the same 
level of participation as poor mostly Anglo neighborhoods.  
Figure 4.4. Effects of Economic Inequality, Income, and Race on Neighborhood Voting 
Rates21 
 
Wealthy mostly African American neighborhoods have higher expected levels of 
participation than their poor counterparts do, across all inequality levels. However, 
wealthy mostly African American neighborhoods have higher levels of expected 
participation at higher levels of income inequality. Participation starts at about 50% until 
these neighborhoods reach median rates of economic inequality, where expected 
                                            
21 Expected values shown with 95% confidence bands. 
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participation levels at about 80%. Although participation rates of wealthy mostly African 
American neighborhoods have lower levels of participation at the lowest levels of 
participation, as levels of income inequality start to increase, expected participation for 
these neighborhoods surpasses Anglo neighborhoods of similar median household 
incomes.  
As economic inequality increases, poor mostly Anglo neighborhoods show a 
steady but slight decrease in participation; from about 55% at the lowest levels to about 
42% at the highest. As economic inequality increases, wealthy mostly Anglo 
neighborhoods show a steady and slightly increased decline in participation, from about 
60% at the lowest rates of economic inequality to about 44% at the highest rates. These 
findings potentially indicate while previous research on the effects of income inequality 
on participation rates were unable to agree upon the relationship. Different racial groups 
are reacting to higher levels of income inequality in different ways. Higher levels of 
income inequality are causing mostly African American neighborhoods to participate 
more, and the effect on mostly Anglo neighborhoods is either small and negative or 
non-existent.  
Figure 4.5 presents results for mostly Latina/o neighborhoods, with the results for 
mostly Anglo neighborhoods as a reference, and produces findings similar to those for 
African Americans. Poor mostly Latina/o neighborhoods appear to respond to 
increasing economic inequality in a manner similar to poor mostly African American 
neighborhoods, starting with participation rates about 30% at the lowest levels of 
economic inequality and increasing to about 37% at the highest levels. Wealthy mostly 
Latina/o neighborhoods show much lower levels of participation than either wealthy 
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mostly African American, Anglo or poor mostly Anglo neighborhoods. At higher levels of 
income inequality, the predicted rate of political participation increases for wealthy 
mostly Latina/o, from about 39% at the lowest levels of economic inequality to about 
90% at the highest levels.   
Figure 4.5. Effects of Economic Inequality, Income, and Ethnicity on Neighborhood 
Voting Rates22 
 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present relatively clear support for Hypotheses 2 and 3, 
providing evidence that different racial and ethnic groups respond to changes in 
economic inequality differently, and indicating that different models of the relationship 
between economic inequality and political participation may be appropriate for different 
economic/racial/ethnic groups. Although poor mostly African American and Latina/o 
neighborhoods show rates of political participation lower than that of poor mostly Anglo 
neighborhoods, minority groups respond to increases in economic inequality by 
                                            
22 Expected values shown with 95% confidence bands. 
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increasing their participation rates, while mostly Anglo neighborhoods show decreases 
in participation. While this research was unable to fully measure the effect of in-group 
connectivity, we would expect that the existence of such would lead to greater levels of 
participation stemming from the desire to improve in-group conditions. This is exactly 
what these models indicate; neighborhoods with higher levels of in-group connectivity 
are demonstrating higher levels of participation produced from higher levels of 
inequality.   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Using micro-level analysis, this research has identified racial/ethnic/economic 
group differences in participatory response to changes in economic inequality. While 
Anglo groups respond to increasing income inequality differently based on economic 
position, with wealthier groups increasing participation, or staying static, and poor 
groups decreasing in participation, minority groups appear to be responding to 
increases in inequality by increasingly participating in politics. In fact, wealthier minority 
populations have substantially increased expected participation rates as economic 
inequality increases. The causal mechanism proposed by this research is that minority 
populations have higher levels of social connectivity that allows them to act collectively, 
and thus increase their collective competition for governmental resources.  
Although minority populations respond to higher levels of income inequality with 
increased levels of participation, these groups may not be in any better position to 
reduce the negative effects of inequality that disproportionately affect the minority 
community. The results do indicate that higher levels of participation are expected for 
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minority neighborhoods as the level of inequality increases, but because minority 
populations are disproportionately at the bottom of the income distribution, even at the 
highest level of participation the average minority neighborhood is still expected to have 
a lower voting rate than the average Anglo neighborhood.   
One of the limitations of this work is that the social connectedness theory is not 
tested empirically; it exists as the causal mechanism that produces the effects that this 
research identifies. Testing social connectedness has its limitations grounded in the 
difficulty in appropriately measuring the concepts at the neighborhood level. Instead of 
measuring the levels of social connectedness, this research develops a theoretical 
claim that communities with higher levels of social connectedness should respond to 
higher levels of income inequality by mobilizing to support the community and produce 
higher levels of participation. To test this theoretical claim, I examined the effects of 
higher levels of income inequality on groups that previous research had identified as 
having higher levels of in-group connectedness, minority communities, against an Anglo 
baseline. The results were consistent with what would be expected from the social 
connectedness theory; minority groups respond to higher levels of income inequality 
with higher levels of participation. 
The effect of social connectedness should depend on the ability of the group to 
mobilize to better the economic or political circumstances of the group. Elections should 
serve as a mechanism to improve group circumstances only insofar as the group sees 
said election as having the potential to make meaningful changes to current 
circumstances. This implies that certain elections will have greater potential to improve 
circumstances, through descriptive candidates or redistributive propositions. Future 
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researchers can leverage this implication by comparing elections that have more explicit 
potential to improve group circumstances. Ultimately, researchers should find, 
consistent with the findings presented here, that groups that feel a greater sense of 
connection, that have higher levels of social capital, are the ones most likely to respond 
to economic difficulties, such as rising inequality, in a manner most suited to make 







This chapter concludes the dissertation, and proceeds accordingly. In the first 
section I briefly summarize the findings. In the second section I discuss the theoretical 
and substantive implications of the dissertation. In section three I suggest a number of 
potential research projects that stem from this research. In section four I offer some 
concluding remarks.  
 
5.1 Summary of Findings  
Previous economic theories indicate that as income inequality increases, a larger 
proportion of the population should desire redistributive benefits (Meltzer and Richard 
1980), but a smaller proportion of the population will participate (Brady 2004; Solt 2010). 
The research presented here provides evidence that increasing income inequality 
increases levels of political participation as people compete for the resources and 
particularized benefits of government, but only to a point. At high levels of income 
inequality, preferences diverge and participation rates change, however unevenly based 
on racial/ethnic composition. Under certain circumstances, increasing income inequality 
makes political participation more attractive as a means to improve economic 
distributions. In response to this, and because of the expected costs of redistributive 
programs, the well-off mobilize to counteract the increased participation of the poor. At 
the highest levels of income inequality, an income bias in the electorate forms, and 
citizens in the highest income quintile are much more likely to vote than the poor, and 
much more likely to oppose liberal economic policies. 
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These trends could threaten American democracy. Increasing income inequality 
produces systematic differences in participation and preferences, which leads to a 
system that is more responsive to a subset of the American electorate. These findings 
suggest a political climate where decision makers have become more responsive to 
members of certain economic classes, while neglecting others. 
In Chapter 2, I analyzed the effects of higher levels of income inequality on 
preferences for liberal economic policies, and the distribution of preferences, and found 
that income inequality affects both the adoption of preferences as well as the 
distribution of individuals within a community who share policy preferences. First, I find 
lower levels of support for liberal economic policies in communities with higher levels of 
median incomes, but that this relationship is conditioned by level of income inequality. 
As income inequality increase, the proportion of the population that supports liberal 
economic policies increases. This finding indicates that absolute and relative resources 
are working in opposite directions for the formation of economic policy preferences. 
Inequality affects the distribution of preferences by primarily affecting the distribution of 
individual’s economic positions within a population. At higher levels of income 
inequality, the probability that the majority of the population will be below the average 
income increases. At the highest levels of inequality, the vast majority of the population 
will be below average income, and support for liberal economic policies will be high. 
However, I find that inequality has a smaller tertiary effect of altering the proportion of 
the population that supports liberal economic policies irrespective to the proportion of 
the population below the state median income. Taken together, increasing income 
inequality increases support for redistributive policies. 
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Second, I find that income inequality affects the distribution of preferences within 
a population. At very low levels of income inequality, the distribution of preferences in a 
community displays high levels of kurtosis and skew in the direction of median 
community income. In communities with high median income, the majority will oppose 
liberal economic policies, and in communities with low median income, the majority will 
oppose them. As income inequality increases, the distribution of preference will move 
towards an evenly bimodal distribution, with the proportions of the population that 
oppose or support liberal economic policies becoming approximately equal in size. At 
this level of income inequality, political competition and mobilization should be at its 
highest. Additional increases in inequality increase the proportion of the population 
below median incomes, and the distribution of preferences skews towards support for 
liberal economic policies. These findings are drawn from actual voting rates, and 
confirms what has been observed in public opinion polls. 
In Chapter 3, I develop a new theory for the relationship between income 
inequality and participation. I theorize the influence that income inequality has on 
political participation is based on the distribution of political power of individuals at 
different points of the economic spectrum, the difference in preferences that is formed 
as income inequality increases, and the proportion of the population that can afford to 
participate in politics. Participation should increase as inequality increases, as it drives 
the proportion of the population holding divergent preferences towards equal 
proportions. This near equal distribution in preferences increases political competition, 
which in turn drives mobilization and participation. As competition increases with an 
increase in inequality, the costs of participation also increase, due to the resulting 
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imbalance of power between the rich and the poor and the increasing proportion of the 
population that can no longer afford to participate. Once inequality hits a critical point, 
the rising costs to participation leads to fewer people at the bottom of the income 
distribution participating, decreases political competition, decreased mobilization, which 
further decreases participation. As populations experience high levels of participation, 
the mobilization effects will completely give way to differences in relative power and 
resources, decreasing participation, and participation will reach its lowest rates.  
To test my theoretical expectations, I employ inequality and voting data from 
1992 to 2012 and find that levels of participation are affected by changes in inequality 
contingent on both the size of the change as well as the current levels of inequality 
affecting the population experiencing change. Consistent with my theory I find that 
participation rates are low in populations with near income equality (45% for general 
elections and 27% for Primary elections).  At middling levels of inequality, higher levels 
of participation are expected (57% for general elections and 36% for Primary elections). 
However, expected rates of participation are the lowest at the highest levels of 
participation (40% for general elections and 22% for Primary elections). Previous 
researchers have attempted to identify a linear relationship between income inequality 
and participation, and have yet to come to consensus on how income inequality affects 
participation rates. This chapter theorizes, and finds evidence of, a non-linear 
relationship. The possibility of a curvilinear relationship has been overlooked, and is the 
largest theoretical implication of this chapter. 
In chapter 4, I examined racial/ethnic/economic group differences in participatory 
response to changes in economic inequality. Recent research has shown that 
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increasing economic inequality in America has led to decreasing levels of political 
participation in the form of voting. However, these studies have treated all Americans 
the same while not accounting for the possibility of different responses to increasing 
income inequality from different racial and ethnic groups. I examined the way that 
different racial/ethnic groups, with different levels of social connectedness responded to 
income inequality. I drew upon recent research in in-group social capital to theorize that 
group-centered opinions and feelings of solidarity, in minority populations, motivate 
minority populations to increase political interests and participation in politics in 
response to increasing income inequality. 
To test my theoretical expectations, I examined neighborhood voting rates, and 
levels of income inequality, from 1992 to 2012, and utilized spatial regression modeling, 
to show that different racial/ethnic groups respond to changing levels of income 
inequality differently. I show that neighborhoods that are primarily African Americans, 
and to a lesser extent Latina/o, respond with increasing participation, while only the 
poor Anglo majority responds by becoming increasingly disenfranchised. Although the 
results indicate that minority neighborhoods will respond to increased inequality with 
increased participation, because minority populations are disproportionately at the 
bottom of the income distribution, minority neighborhoods are still expected to have a 
lower voting rate than similarly unequal Anglo neighborhood. This finding emphasizes 
the importance of the interaction between race, ethnicity, and economic inequality and 
suggests that the lack of social capital within the poor Anglo community is driving the 
lower levels of voter turnout identified in previous research. 
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5.2 Implications  
One of the implication of this research is that individuals living in the highest 
inequality context may no longer have the ability to pursue an approach to reducing 
income inequality that depends on signaling policy makers through democratic action. 
At the highest levels of inequality, participation reaches its lowest level, and is 
increasingly biased towards the wealthy. This class-bias leads to a less equitable 
balance of power between the haves and the have-nots, affects the substance of 
economic policy, has real and lasting effects on distributional outcomes, and can make 
inequality even worse. The result of this cyclical process is high inequality populations 
reinforcing higher levels of inequality though an inability to foster policy change. 
Furthermore, this research indicates that if populations want to work towards the 
improvement of their economic standing, they may want to stay in more 
economically/racially/ethnically homogenous communities. This implication is 
contradictory to the normative movement towards greater levels of diversity and 
inclusiveness along economic and race lines. Such policies as greater neighborhood 
desegregation, or planned mixed income communities may be making it harder to build 
the kind of in-group social connectedness that is necessary to improve group 
circumstances. While this conclusion may seem morally repugnant, and contrary to 
decades of progress, it does exist as an implication of this work. 
There are a number of practical applications of this research that are of interest 
to campaigns, policy entrepreneurs, and public opinion researchers. Campaigns almost 
never operate with slack resources, which provides pressure on campaigns to be as 
strategic with their resources as possible. The results from chapters two and three may 
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offer campaign organizers, and media consultants, additional information on where their 
resources may be the most effective. For instance, say a candidate supports liberal 
economic policies and wants to gain an electoral advantage. They would want to go 
where support for those policies is the highest, but participation may be low, so that 
mobilization effects will produce the highest returns on their investment. These chapters 
indicate that campaign efforts in low median income low inequality neighborhoods will 
reach the largest proportion of policy supportive unlikely voters. In these environments, 
mobilization efforts may be the most effective. Likewise, if a candidate opposes liberal 
economic policies, they would want to expend their resources in high median income, 
high inequality, communities, as this context offers candidates with that preferences the 
largest pool of policy supportive unlikely voters.  
There are additional practical applications for representatives. Public opinion 
research at the sub-state level is often cost prohibitive. However, most politicians in 
America represent populations smaller than whole states. Politicians could use this 
research to extrapolate likely preferences on liberal economic policies of sub-state 
populations from demographic data and statewide public opinion polls. The fining from 
Chapter 3 indicate that the deviation in preferences for a population, from a state 
baseline, is dependent on those populations’ deviations in inequality and median 
income. For populations that are more unequal (higher income inequality) than the state 
as a whole, support for liberal economic policies should be higher than the state 
average. In populations that are less unequal (less income inequality), support for liberal 
economic policies relative to the state average will depend on median income. When a 
population has a higher median income than the state median income, that population 
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should oppose liberal economic policies more than the state average. When a 
population has a lower median income than the state median income, that population 
should support liberal economic policies more than the state average 
One of the primary limitations of this work is that it only tests the effect of a single 
level of contextual inequality, the local level. However, changes to political preferences 
and participation could be influenced by many contexts of inequality, as Baybeck (2006) 
concludes. Individuals can base their perceptions of inequality on their neighborhood, 
city, state, and even nation. All of these levels could be exerting independent effects on 
political preferences and participation independent of one another, and this research is 
unable to disaggregate those different effects. Furthermore, inequality at different levels 
could activate policy considerations at that level; where national trends in inequality 
could affect preferences for national tax policy, inequality trends at the state level could 
affect preferences for minimum wage laws or nutrition assistance, and inequality at the 
local level could be most salient for municipal policies. Individuals may live under 
multiple inequality contexts, where inequality may be low at the local level, high at the 
state level, and middling at the national level, and these contexts may be exerting 
contradictory pressures on individual behavior. Unfortunately, this research is unable to 
examine the effects of inequality in different contexts.  
An additional limitation of this work is that it assumes that inequality at the local 
level is following larger inequality trends. However, the increases in income inequality 
found nationally may not necessarily be evident at local levels. Although aggregate 
income and wealth inequality is increasing, so is class based segregation, where the 
haves are living in communities increasingly populated by other haves and the have-
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nots are living in communities increasingly populated by other have-nots. The way that 
national level inequality is affecting local level inequality is yet unknown as it is an effect 
of rising aggregate inequality and increasing economic segregation. Future research 
should determine if national level trends are being mirrored at the local level to 
determine if an increase in participation, produced by local level inequality, should be 
expected from increases in national-level inequality. 
 
5.3 Future Research  
Although this dissertation has clarified a number of the relationships between 
increasing inequality and levels of political participation and preferences formation, it 
has also left a number of assumptions untested. These assumptions are fodder for 
future scholarly research, and I would like to take a minute and discuss some of them. 
As inequality affects preferences and participation rates, it is unclear how these 
trends affect the responsiveness of government. Chapter 2 indicates that the 
populations with the highest levels of inequality have the greatest expected support for 
liberal economic policies, yet Chapter 3 indicates that they are the least likely to vote. If 
the voting rates of supporters of liberal economic policies are the most effected by 
increasing inequality, then the government may become less supportive of these 
policies, and less responsive to supporters of redistributive policies. Although this 
possibility is less likely in direct democracy election, such as the ones examine in 
Chapter 2, this information could be used to test a representation hypothesis. Using 
voting rates on ballot propositions with an economic frame (a larger subset of all 
propositions than the inequality frame propositions examined in Chapter 2) to develop a 
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community-neighborhood economic liberalism score. This research could follow a 
similar quantification method as the DW-Nominate scores for representatives employed 
by Poole and Rosenthal (1997). Community-neighborhood economic liberalism scores 
could be compared to the economic liberalism scores of representatives who represent 
those populations to determine if rising inequality is producing an income bias in 
representation. Additionally, tis methodology could test the differences in 
responsiveness of state and national level representatives, to see if the class-bias 
extends beyond national-level representatives to local-level ones.    
Additional research could determine if rising inequality is affecting rates of 
candidate emergence. It is possible that the representational inequality that has been 
identified (Bartels 2002; Gilens 2005, 2009; Jacobs and Page 2005; Flavin 2012) is not 
a product of representatives choosing to be less responsive to the preferences of 
certain members of their constituency, but could be affecting the emergence of quality 
candidates whose preference align with that of lower socioeconomic populations. 
Although extensive research has been done on the effects of racial inequality (Barreto, 
Segura, and Woods 2004; Canon 1999; Branton 2009) and gender inequality (Fox and 
Lawless 2004; Pettey 2017) on candidate emergence, no study to date has fully 
examine the effects of income inequality on candidate emergence. I theorize that rising 
inequality inhibits the emergence of quality candidates that support the policies of lower 
socioeconomic classes, which leads to a class-bias in choices, if not necessarily in 
preferences. I would test this proposition using a national dataset on emergent political 
candidates to determine if inequality has affected rates of emergence of candidates 
from different socioeconomic backgrounds.  
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While one of the limitations to Chapter 4 is that it does not directly test the 
existence of higher levels of social capital in certain populations, the effect of rising 
income inequality on social capital formation is a potential avenue for future research. 
Chapter for provides evidence for the theory that some populations leverage social 
connectedness to mobilize a group effort to redress group based grievances. Thus, 
rising inequality leads to greater levels of political participation. What we do not know is 
how rising income inequality, ceteris paribus, influences the formation of social capital. 
One of the theories presented in Chapter 4 is that that being poor is not a social 
organizational factor strong enough to develop strong group attachments, as people do 
not see a benefit from being a member of this group. Therefore, we should expect that 
in populations that have no other linkage mechanisms than their economic class, levels 
of social capital should never rise above low levels. However, in populations that have 
pre-existing linkage mechanisms, increasing income inequality ay increase the levels of 
social capital, as it provides additional motivations to act collectively. I could test this 
theory using nationally representative surveys that assess social capital, and compare 
how rising inequality has affected social capital creation in populations with pre-existing 
social linkages, such as racial/ethnic homogeneity, strong union membership, or high 
levels of church attendance. This research could test whether income inequality had an 
effect on the formation of social capital, independent of other factors known to increase 
social capital.    
Finally, in future research I could test the theory, presented in Chapter 3, that as 
inequality increases, the proportion of the population that is unable to pay the costs of 
participation increases, by examining the effect that inequality has on voter roll-off. Roll-
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off voting is the process where individuals vote for the major offices, but do not vote for 
the lower positions, resulting in a partial ballot. This study would build off previous 
research on the information theory of voter participation that argues that voters rely on 
information to vote, and if they do not feel comfortable, or lack the necessary amount of 
information, they will not vote (Matsusaka 1995; Wattenberg, McAllister, and Salvanto 
2000; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). If income inequality is increasing the proportion of 
the population that has the necessary resources to participate in politics, the proportion 
of roll-off voters should increase, and looking at overall participation rates may 
understate the negative effects of rising inequality on participation.   
 
5.4 Conclusion  
Over the course of this dissertation, I have examined a few of the ways that 
higher levels of inequality have affected political behavior in an American state. 
Although I have focused on a single state, I have discussed the many reasons why this 
research is applicable to the nation as a whole. Furthermore, even though America may 
seem increasingly divided, along lines of race, class, religion, sexual orientation, 
partisanship, and interpretations of the American dream, community and neighborhood 
life in America has far more similarities than differences. People of all stripes respond to 
changes in their economic environment in much the same way, although some have 
additional resources that allow them to respond largely. For these reasons, the 
behaviors that I examined in California are likely to be present in every state from 
Alabama to Wyoming.   
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APPENDIX A  




 1992 1993 1994 1996 
 Prop 167 Prop 172 Prop 173 Prop 185 Prop 210 
      
Median family 
Income  
-0.159*** -0.085*** -0.023 -0.071*** -0.093*** 
      (in $10,000) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (0.017) (0.028) 
Income Inequality 0.095** -0.005 -0.121*** 0.247*** 0.100 
 (0.040) (0.030) (0.024) (0.054) (0.065) 
% College 
graduates 
0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Female -0.002*** -0.000 0.001 -0.002** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% African 
American 
0.001** 0.000 0.001*** -0.001 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Latino\a -0.000 -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Other 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
% Democratic 
Vote Share 
0.160*** 0.094*** 0.039* 0.185*** 0.236*** 
 (0.044) (0.030) (0.021) (0.054) (0.047) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.033 0.007 -0.028 -0.056 -0.020 
 (0.027) (0.017) (0.019) (0.034) (0.038) 
Constant 0.486*** 0.515*** 0.714*** 0.120* 0.495*** 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.034) (0.064) (0.048) 
      
Observations 20,739 20,735 20,737 21,200 20,918 
R-squared 0.431 0.212 0.401 0.508 0.585 
 
 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 
 Prop 217 Prop 10a Prop 11 Prop 37 Prop 47 
      
Median family 
Income  
-0.174*** -0.014 -0.010* -0.033** -0.080*** 
      (in $10,000) (0.019) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.017) 
Income Inequality 0.030 0.037 0.104*** 0.062*** 0.037 
 (0.050) (0.037) (0.031) (0.021) (0.026) 
% College 
graduates 
0.001*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Female -0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.177*** 0.080 





0.001* -0.000 -0.002** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
% Latino\a 0.000 0.002*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Other 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.004* 0.001 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
% Democratic 
Vote Share 
0.175*** 0.119*** 0.063*** 0.214*** 0.197*** 
 (0.044) (0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.053) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.050* -0.021 -0.034** 0.001 0.067** 
 (0.030) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) 
Constant 0.515*** 0.223*** 0.377*** 0.541*** 0.301*** 
 (0.046) (0.028) (0.040) (0.033) (0.048) 
      
Observations 20,917 16,225 16,223 16,185 22,174 
R-squared 0.468 0.502 0.498 0.543 0.547 
 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2008 
 Prop 67 Prop 76 Prop 87 Prop 3 Prop 10 
      
Median family  -0.079*** -0.104*** -0.098*** -0.029* -0.067*** 
      (in $10,000) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) 
Income Inequality 0.068** 0.061 0.103*** 0.016 -0.063*** 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.027) (0.023) (0.020) 
% College 
graduates 
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Female -0.172*** -0.041 -0.167** 0.120*** -0.026 
 (0.056) (0.075) (0.065) (0.043) (0.047) 
% African 
American 
0.001** 0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Latino\a 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Other 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.008** 0.006*** 0.003* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Democratic 
Vote Share 
0.212*** 0.279*** 0.277*** 0.140*** 0.037 
 (0.036) (0.043) (0.042) (0.022) (0.029) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
0.008 0.031 -0.016 -0.064*** -0.072*** 
 (0.030) (0.039) (0.030) (0.018) (0.016) 
Constant 0.344*** 0.402*** 0.294*** 0.333*** 0.398*** 
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 (0.040) (0.041) (0.053) (0.029) (0.032) 
      
Observations 22,380 22,364 22,380 22,391 22,391 
R-squared 0.478 0.548 0.496 0.646 0.557 
 
 
 2008 2010 2012 
 Prop 12 Prop 24 Prop 30 Prop 38 Prop 39 







-0.067*** -0.071*** -0.087*** 
      (in $10,000) (0.010) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.014) 
Income Inequality 0.030* 0.011 0.039 0.074** 0.084*** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.027) (0.033) (0.020) 
% College graduates -0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Female 0.038 -0.011 -0.033 -0.115* -0.562*** 
 (0.039) (0.049) (0.057) (0.068) (0.080) 
% African American 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Latino\a 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Other 0.002 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Democratic Vote 
Share 
0.053*** 0.251*** 0.265*** 0.241*** 0.165*** 
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.006 -0.032 -0.013 0.016 -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) 
Constant 0.583*** 0.305*** 0.379*** 0.279*** 0.625*** 
 (0.019) (0.034) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044) 
      
Observations 22,391 22,411 22,411 22,411 22,411 
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THE EFFECTS OF INCOME INEQUALITY ON PREFERENCE DISTRIBUTIONS 
(SPECIFIC PROPOSITIONS)  
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 1992 1993 1994 1996 
 Prop 167 Prop 172 Prop 173 Prop 185 Prop 210 
      
Income Inequality -0.924*** -0.570*** -0.570*** -0.332** -0.658*** 
 (0.156) (0.105) (0.105) (0.164) (0.122) 
Income Inequality2 1.239*** 0.812*** 0.812*** 0.282 0.634*** 
 (0.252) (0.133) (0.133) (0.209) (0.206) 
Median Family 
Income 
0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% College graduates -0.001 0.001** 0.001** 0.005*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
% Female 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
% African American -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Latino\a -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Other -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
% Democratic Vote 
Share 
0.016 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.053** -0.051 
 (0.048) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022) (0.034) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
0.009 -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.018 
 (0.031) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.034) 
Constant 0.335*** 0.254*** 0.254*** 0.330*** 0.499*** 
 (0.100) (0.060) (0.060) (0.034) (0.080) 
Observations 20,741 20,737 20,737 21,198 20,918 
R-squared 0.146 0.187 0.187 0.684 0.215 




 1996 1998 2000 2002 
 Prop 217 Prop 10a Prop 11 Prop 37 Prop 47 
      
Income Inequality -0.921*** -0.705*** -0.588*** -0.220 -0.588*** 
 (0.112) (0.140) (0.175) (0.137) (0.136) 
Income Inequality2 1.363*** 1.345*** 1.284*** 0.397** 0.954*** 
 (0.133) (0.178) (0.288) (0.163) (0.178) 
Median Family 
Income 
0.000** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% College graduates 0.001 0.001 0.003*** 0.001** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Female -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.189*** -0.341*** 
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 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.064) (0.079) 
% African American -0.001 -0.002*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
% Latino\a -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Other -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001* -0.001*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
% Democratic Vote 
Share 
0.385*** 0.088*** 0.118** -0.010 0.377*** 
 (0.033) (0.028) (0.048) (0.018) (0.088) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.072* 0.057 0.022 0.100*** 0.299*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.019) (0.020) (0.042) 
Constant 0.321*** 0.356*** 0.114*** 0.137*** 0.086 
 (0.053) (0.075) (0.042) (0.039) (0.053) 
Observations 20,917 21,227 21,225 16,437 22,197 
R-squared 0.431 0.121 0.296 0.269 0.606 




 2004 2005 2006 2008 
 Prop 67 Prop 76 Prop 87 Prop 3 Prop 10b 
      
Income Inequality -0.557*** -0.622*** -0.715*** -0.238* -0.415** 
 (0.121) (0.195) (0.199) (0.123) (0.157) 
Income Inequality2 0.629*** 0.827*** 0.969*** 0.329* 0.652*** 
 (0.159) (0.259) (0.257) (0.167) (0.196) 
Median Family 
Income 
0.000*** 0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% College graduates -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Female 0.104 -0.231** -0.430*** -0.073 -0.508*** 
 (0.089) (0.096) (0.118) (0.063) (0.103) 
% African American -0.000 0.002 -0.004*** 0.003* -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
% Latino\a -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Other -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004*** 0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
% Democratic Vote 
Share 
-0.130*** 0.304*** 0.301*** 0.247*** 0.415*** 
 (0.022) (0.056) (0.038) (0.055) (0.044) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
0.001 -0.080 -0.168*** 0.237*** 0.026 
 (0.035) (0.052) (0.051) (0.074) (0.051) 
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Constant 0.417*** 0.475*** 0.819*** -0.019 0.479*** 
 (0.047) (0.075) (0.048) (0.072) (0.082) 
Observations 22,395 22,395 22,395 22,394 22,394 
R-squared 0.286 0.295 0.275 0.635 0.473 




 2008 2010 2012 
 Prop 12 Prop 24 Prop 30 Prop 38 Prop 39 
      
Income Inequality -0.365** -0.544*** -0.544*** -0.531** -0.457* 
 (0.162) (0.164) (0.164) (0.210) (0.228) 
Income Inequality2 0.522** 0.853*** 0.853*** 0.745** 0.622* 
 (0.211) (0.215) (0.215) (0.294) (0.314) 
Median Family 
Income 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% College graduates -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
% Female 0.013 -0.120 -0.120 -0.202** -0.374*** 
 (0.147) (0.097) (0.097) (0.094) (0.133) 
% African American 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.004*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
% Latino\a -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Other -0.001* -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Democratic Vote 
Share 
-0.079 -0.042 -0.042 0.265*** 0.121*** 
 (0.059) (0.048) (0.048) (0.044) (0.035) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.013 0.010 0.010 -0.156** 0.001 
 (0.059) (0.045) (0.045) (0.059) (0.031) 
Constant 0.394*** 0.450*** 0.450*** 0.498*** 0.463*** 
 (0.108) (0.070) (0.070) (0.053) (0.063) 
Observations 22,394 22,411 22,411 22,411 22,411 
R-squared 0.188 0.223 0.223 0.254 0.097 






















































































































































































































































































N 21,215 21,215 21,215 21,215 21,215 21,215 21,215 22,407 22,407 22,407 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
R-sqrd .369 .390 .300 .285 .192 .549 .351 .435 .545 .520 





























































































































































































































































N 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 23,116 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
R-sqrd .569 .448 .577 .379 .506 .422 .503 .655 .655 .549 







































































































































































































































































N 21,215 21,215 21,215 21,215 21,215 21,215 21,215 22,407 22,407 22,407 
Prob>chi2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Rho 1.995 2.157 2.457 3.262 2.314 3.107 3.024 3.291 3.634 2.940 
Sigma2 .003 .004 .004 .004 .003  .003 .004 .006 .005 .004 































































































































































































































































N 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 22,401 23,116 
Prob>chi2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Rho 2.231 2.163 1.908 1.886 2.229 1.457 1.757 1.449 1.412 .1444 
Sigma2 .005 .005 .004 .005 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 
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